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Abstract 
When industry compensation is offered to prevent relocation of regulated firms, efficiency requires 
that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted 
by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to 
analyze industry compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which 
allocate permits for free to carbon and trade intensive industries. We estimate that this practice will 
result in overcompensation in the order of €6.7 billion every year. Efficient allocation would reduce 
the aggregate risk of job loss by two thirds without increasing aggregate compensation.   
Keywords 
Industry compensation, industrial relocation, emissions trading, permit allocation, EU ETS, firm data

1 Introduction
Government intervention in the marketplace is often justified as a means to increase net social welfare.
When imposing welfare-improving regulation, a benevolent government may be able to tax part of
the welfare gains and use the revenue to compensate industry for the cost of compliance. But when
should compensation be offered, to whom, and how much? Should firms that pollute the environment
be offered compensation for the cost impact of a regulation that forces them to internalize the envi-
ronmental damage? Should financial institutions be offered compensation for a tax levied on financial
transactions?
The distributional effects of regulation have far-reaching consequences for policy design. If no
compensation is offered, industry has incentives to spend large amounts on raising political support
against the policy, and to lobby for exemption clauses that weaken the policy’s effectiveness. Worse,
when the policy is not harmonized across jurisdictions, firms may find it profitable to relocate to an
unregulated one. As the head of a leading financial transactions company recently told the BBC: “If
[the financial transaction tax] really happened, we would have to move our business to New York
or Singapore or Hong Kong. Our business would continue. [It is] just sad it wouldn’t continue in
London.”1 The threat of relocation – if credible – is a powerful argument to extract concessions from
politicians of all stripes, as regulation-induced job losses are likely to cloud their re-election prospects.
In the realm of climate policy, the threat of relocation is aggravated by “carbon leakage”, i.e. the
phenomenon that industrial relocation shifts greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to places beyond the
regulator’s reach. Since GHG emissions are a global public bad, relocation not only costs jobs at
home but also weakens the environmental effectiveness of the policy. It is therefore not surprising that
generous compensations are pervasive in this area.2 For example, numerous European countries have
implemented carbon taxes since the 1990-ies, and virtually all of them grant rebates or exemptions
to energy-intensive firms, even though doing so runs counter to the polluter-pays principle underlying
environmental policy-making in the EU.
This paper puts forth the simple but so far little appreciated economic logic that compensation
should be offered first to those firms where it leads to the highest marginal improvement of the gov-
ernment’s objective function associated with the policy. This is different from compensating the firms
with the highest propensity to relocate. Rather, an efficient compensation rule equalizes, across firms,
the firms’ marginal propensity to relocate, weighted by how damaging their relocation is to the gov-
ernment’s objectives.
We analyze the implications of this idea in the context of industry compensation rules established
under the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), the largest cap-and-trade system
worldwide. The EU ETS imposes an overall cap on CO2 emissions from stationary sources – mostly
power stations and industrial plants – in 30 countries. Emitters with heterogeneous abatement costs
can trade permits amongst each other or with third parties so as to lower their total abatement cost
and hence, the total cost of the cap on CO2. Since the beginning of the EU ETS in 2005, industrial
emitters have been compensated for the cost of compliance by receiving fairly generous allocations of
free permits based on their past CO2 emissions. Contrary to its initial plan of phasing in auctioning
of permits from 2013, the EU Commission (EC) decided in 2009 that free permit allocation would be
continued for industries deemed at a heightened risk of carbon leakage. Determining which industries
are at risk is complicated by asymmetric information about compliance costs. Regulated firms face
1BBC interview with Michael Spencer, Group Chief Executive Officer of ICAP, available online at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16990025.
2The evidence on whether the threat of relocation is credible is very scant when it comes to climate policy. Martin,
de Preux, and Wagner (2011) find no evidence that the UK Climate Change Levy caused output reductions or plant exit
among treated firms. The literature on FDI and more broadly-defined environmental regulation suggests that relocation
decisions in some industries are indeed deterred by environmental regulatory stringency(e.g. Wagner and Timmins, 2009;
Hanna, 2010).
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an incentive to exaggerate these costs in order to extract more rents in the form of free permits, or
to lobby for a more lenient overall cap. The EC decided to exempt from permit auctions industries
that are either very carbon intensive or very trade-exposed, or exceed certain threshold values on both
measures. There is, however, no empirical evidence that these exemption criteria are in any way related
to actual relocation or downsizing risk, let alone the marginal impacts of compensation on such risk.
This paper provides the first evidence on this topic based on new firm-level data we gathered
in telephone interviews with managers of 761 manufacturing firms in six European countries. We
applied a new survey tool developed recently by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) with the objective to
mitigate known types of bias arising in conventional survey formats. An obvious bias to be concerned
about in our context would be that firms overstate their vulnerability to future carbon pricing, along
the lines of the financial executive quoted above. This is not supported by the data. In all countries
and in most industries, the average downsizing risk remains well below a 10% cut in production or
employment. In none of the industries we studied did we find that the average firm will close down
entirely and relocate to a non-European country. There is, however, substantial variation in the reported
vulnerability between sectors as well as individual firms.
We correlate the vulnerability measure derived from the interview responses with the sector-level
criteria for free permit allocation devised by the EU. While carbon intensity is a good predictor of vul-
nerability, trade intensity is not. This is a reason for concern because most exemptions from auctioning
will be granted on the basis of the trade intensity criterion alone. We propose two simple improvements
to the EU criteria, based on the principle that free permits should only be given to industries where the
average relocation risk is significantly higher than that of non-exempt industries. First, by not exempt-
ing trade intensive sectors but the ones that are at least moderately carbon intensive as well, European
governments could raise additional auction revenue in the order of C6.7 billion every year. Second, we
show that a sector’s intensity of trade with less developed countries such as China is a better proxy for
vulnerability than the overall trade intensity. A change in the definition of the trade intensity criterion
along these lines would raise an additional C2.8 billion in auction revenues per year.
The large heterogeneity in relocation risk in our data suggests that further efficiency gains could be
reaped by allocating free permits at the firm level. We thus develop a normative framework for industry
compensation under the threat of relocation. The key idea is that free permits should be given to those
firms where they have the highest marginal impact on aggregate CO2 leakage or job risk. Using the
interview data, we show that this marginal impact varies substantially across firms and sectors, and that
it is not necessarily correlated with the impact level. We employ dynamic programming techniques
to minimize the aggregate risk of either job loss or CO2 leakage for a given amount of permits to
be allocated for free. Counterfactual simulations reveal that optimal allocation dramatically reduces
this risk, even when compared to the situation where all permits are handed out for free. We also
consider the dual problem of minimizing the number of permits handed out for free while constraining
the aggregate risk. We find that the aggregate risk of job loss or carbon leakage resulting from an
application of the current EU criteria could be achieved with just a fraction of the amount of permits
that will be handed out for free. The mismatch between optimal and actual allocations is particularly
severe when it comes to minimizing the risk of job loss. This means that, contrary to their official
justification, the current exemption criteria do too little to mitigate the risk to jobs that arises from
carbon pricing.
In view of these inefficiencies, we use the normative framework to examine the distributional
consequences of the EC criteria. We find that Germany is the country in our sample which benefits, by
far, the most from the deviation from optimal allocations. Moreover, we show evidence that the latest
EU rules do little to narrow a gaping inequality in the distribution of free permits across firms, even
after normalizing by the number of employees.
Finally, we derive various rules for assigning optimal allocations at the firm-level under a ‘feasi-
bility constraint’ which ensures that these allocation rules are based on easily observable firm charac-
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teristics. We find that even simple rules, based only on firm-level employment and carbon emissions,
yield substantial reductions in the risk of carbon leakage and job losses due to relocation.
Our paper adds to a rapidly growing literature that collects firm-level data on management prac-
tices in large-scale, cross-country surveys and links them to performance data from commercial and
administrative sources in order to better explain firm-level productivity, energy efficiency and organi-
zational structure (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, Genakos, Martin, and Sadun, 2010a; Bloom,
Sadun, and van Reenen, 2010b, 2012; Martin, Muûls, De Preux, and Wagner, 2012).
Furthermore, our analysis provides new evidence on the competitiveness impacts of the EU ETS.
While the existing literature on this topic (reviewed in detail in the following section) analyzes intensive-
margin adjustments to production, employment and profits, we focus on the extensive-margin impact
relevant for the risk of offshoring and relocation.
Not least, this paper also links to a series of papers that use general equilibrium models to recover
the welfare costs of industry compensation under different environmental policy instruments (Boven-
berg and Goulder, 2002; Bovenberg, Goulder, and Gurney, 2005; Bovenberg, Goulder, and Jacobsen,
2008). While our partial-equilibrium approach allows us to recover only monetary costs of industry
compensation, we are able to calculate these costs with much greater sectoral detail, and to explicitly
account for the rich heterogeneity across individual firms. Furthermore, the compensation scheme we
propose is different from the one used by Bovenberg et al. (2005, 2008) and others , in that it explicitly
aims at preventing relocation and carbon leakage, in line with the EC’s official justification for those
transfers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the relevant institutional
background and summarizes the literature on the EU ETS and competitiveness. Section 3 describes the
data collection and matching, giving particular attention to how we measure firm-level vulnerability to
carbon leakage. Section 4 analyzes the EU criteria and Section 5 presents our framework for optimal
permit allocation under the risk of relocation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Permits, leakage and competitiveness
Designing a cap-and-trade scheme inevitably requires a choice to be made about the initial allocation
of permits. Unless all permits are auctioned off, the regulator has to determine the micro-allocation of
permits across firms, across sectors, and – in an international emissions trading scheme such as the EU
ETS – across countries. According to the independence property of emissions trading (Montgomery,
1972), the permit price only depends on the stringency of the overall cap, but not on the initial alloca-
tion. An implication of this is that the permit allocation per se does not condition firm behavior at the
intensive margin, because firms factor the opportunity cost of using a permit into their marginal cost –
regardless of the initial cost of acquiring permits. Independence need not hold in the presence of mar-
ket power (Hahn, 1984) or transaction costs (Stavins, 1995), but existing research has not rejected the
independence property in the EU ETS (Convery and Redmond, 2007; Reguant and Ellerman, 2008).
In contrast, the extensive-margin behavior of firms is affected by both the overall stringency and
the initial permit allocation. This is because variable profits are decreasing in the permit price and total
profits decrease with the total cost of permits. Thus, full auctioning of emission permits might lower
firm profits to the point where exit or relocation to non-EU countries are worth considering. Likewise,
a more stringent cap may have similar effects as it sustains a higher carbon price. An economic
rationale behind allocating permits for free is thus to mitigate the risk of relocation and carbon leakage
by compensating industry for the adverse profit impacts of emissions trading.
Initial permit allocation in phases I and II of the EU ETS has followed a decentralized process.
Countries were called upon to draw up National Allocation Plans (NAPs) that both fixed the national
cap and determined the sectoral allocation.3 Emission permits were handed out for free (“grandfa-
3Based on a detailed account of the development of the NAPs under phase I in 10 European countries, Ellerman et al.
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thered”) to existing business sites based on their historical emissions, on growth projections and on
the Kyoto obligations of the countries they were located in. For phase III, beginning in 2013, the EC
was aiming to drastically increase the share of permits to be auctioned off, thereby transferring the
ownership of emissions from incumbent polluters back to governments and, ultimately, taxpayers.4
This objective was met with strong opposition from the affected industry associations who convinced
EU law makers that full auctioning of permits would exacerbate the detrimental impact of the EU ETS
on their competitiveness. The EC decided to mitigate the detrimental impacts of a more stringent cap
in trading phase III by continuing to allocate free permits to sectors at significant risk of carbon leak-
age. Directive 2009/29/EC establishes this risk based on (i) carbon intensity (CI), defined as direct
and indirect CO2 costs relative to the value added of a sector, and (ii) trade intensity (TI), defined as
the sector’s trade volume with third countries divided by the total market size in the EU. The directive
also stipulates threshold values for these metrics according to which a sector is exempt from permit
auctioning or not.5
How do these metrics relate to the profit impact of the EU ETS? On the one hand, previously
grandfathered firms will be forced to pay the market price for the right to pollute. The CI measure is
based on the assumption that the cost burden is proportional to the ratio of direct and indirect emissions
to gross value added.
On the other hand, the demand response conditions a firm’s ability to pass on this cost burden to
its consumers in the form of higher prices. Doing so will be more difficult for a firm whose customers
can easily substitute to relatively cheaper products from competitors located outside the EU. Import
penetration is a widely used proxy for cost pass-through. However, the TI metric also contains the
export ratio whose relation to the demand response is ambiguous. While the firm might be competing
with non-EU firms for customers in its exports destinations, a higher export intensity also reflects the
factor specificity of production which tends to mitigate the profit impact of permit auctioning.6 In sum,
there may be sectors that look vulnerable according to EU criteria although they can easily replace
carbon intensive inputs by less carbon intensive ones, or pass-through the cost of permit auctioning in
international product markets.7
There is little empirical evidence linking the EU criteria to a sector’s vulnerability to carbon leak-
age. A large number of ex-ante studies evaluates the impact of the EU ETS on competitiveness –
defined as either production or profitability – using simulation or economic modeling (McKinsey and
Ecofys, 2006a; Demailly and Quirion, 2006, 2008).8 While they predict a negative impact on pro-
duction in most manufacturing industries, these studies also show that profitability is not adversely
affected under free permit allocation. In fact, grandfathering overcompensates many industries (Smale
et al., 2006). An exception to this is primary aluminum production which – although not directly reg-
ulated under ETS phase I – suffers adverse impacts on production and profitability due to its exposure
(2007) show that the principles guiding this development were rather consistent across national governments, as most opted
for free permit allocations based on existing emissions. NAPs submitted for phase II exhibited more stringent caps but
retained the allocation scheme. Ellerman and Joskow (2008) point out that the use of auctioning in phase II remains far short
of what is allowed and that the use of benchmarking remains an exception.
4This was decided in the revision of the Emission Trading Directive, agreed on 17 December 2008.
5The construction of these metrics by the EC is discussed in Section 3.4 below.
6 For instance, a firm that benefits a lot from country specific factors – e.g. a skilled labor force, natural resource deposits,
or externalities from industrial agglomeration – is less likely to relocate in response to full auctioning than a firm that can
easily set up shop elsewhere. If factor specificity creates an absolute advantage (think of Swiss watches), TI will be high
because of strong exports, not imports.
7If aggregation to the sector level lumps together many different products, then domestic firms may be able to pass-
through the costs in some product markets that are less competitive due to concentration or product differentiation, in spite
of a high import penetration at the sector level (Clò, 2010).
8A widespread approach to assessing aggregate leakage effects has been to calibrate computable general equilibrium
models that are capable of predicting the consequences of differential carbon pricing across regions. We do not review these
models here as they are not informative about individual NACE industries. Models with exogenous technical change predict
carbon leakage rates between 5 and 35% for the Kyoto Protocol commitments (Paltsev, 2001).
4
Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk
to higher electricity prices (Reinaud, 2005; McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006a; Smale et al., 2006). Based
on this literature, Sato, Grubb, Cust, Chan, Korppoo, and Ceppi (2007) propose to use trade intensity,
carbon intensity and electricity intensity as proxies for the competitiveness impact of the EU ETS.
Survey evidence shows that EU ETS companies are strongly opposed to more permit auctioning
after 2012 (McKinsey and Ecofys, 2006b). So far, however, the EU ETS seems to have neither resulted
in significant costs, nor induced a fundamental shift in strategy such as relocation or reduction of the
workforce (Kenber et al., 2009).
A few ex-post evaluation studies of the competitiveness effects of the EU ETS have been completed
to date, chiefly based on the first trading phase. Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) find no significant
correlation between the degree of overallocation of German firms and their revenues or employment.
Using balance-sheet data from more than 2,700 European companies for the period between 2005 and
2008, Abrell, Ndoye, and Zachmann (2011) find small negative impact of the EU ETS on employment,
but no significant impact on value added or profit margins. Commins, Lyons, Schiffbauer, and Tol
(2011) also use balance-sheet data for a large sample of European firms and find that phase I of the
EU ETS had a negative effect on productivity and profits, but not on employment. Since treatment
status is determined at the sector level, however, these effects are possibly confounded with those of
sector-level shocks to the outcome variables.9 Going one step further, Bushnell, Chong, and Mansur
(2011) argue that some firms and sectors were profiting from regulation, as the stock prices of ETS
companies – particularly in carbon- and electricity-intensive industries – fell significantly in response
to a precipitous decline in the permit price which occurred in April 2006. In sum, the existing evidence
does not suggest that industrial firms on the whole suffered strong adverse impacts when permits were
allocated for free in the first years of the EU ETS.
3 Data
This paper combines three principal sources of data into a unique firm-level data set suitable for ana-
lyzing the link between permit allocation and carbon leakage. First, we collect data on vulnerability
to carbon pricing – as well as on management practices relating to climate policy more generally – by
interviewing managers of manufacturing firms in six European countries: Belgium, France, Germany,
Hungary, Poland and the UK.10 Second, we augment this information with “hard” data on economic
performance from the ORBIS database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk. Third, we obtain data on CO2
emissions from the official EU ETS registry, known as the Community Independent Transactions Log
(CITL). Additional EU data sources are used to calculate carbon emissions, CI and TI at the sector
level. This section describes the data collection and matching processes and summarizes our core data
set.
3.1 Measuring vulnerability to carbon leakage
3.1.1 Vulnerability score derived from interview responses
To obtain a measure of the expected impact of future climate policies on outsourcing and relocation
decisions, we asked managers:
“Do you expect that government efforts to put a price on carbon emissions will force you
to outsource part of the production of this business site in the foreseeable future, or to
close down completely?”
9In addition, none of these studies addresses a possible selection issue at the sector level.
10Scheduling of interviews began in late August 2009 and the last interview was given in early November 2009.
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Figure 1: Average vulnerability score by country and industry
Germany
France
Poland
UK
Belgium
Hungary
1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
mean 95% conf. int.
(a) by country
Other Minerals
Glass
Fuels
Iron & Steel
Other Business Services
Cement
Ceramics
TV Communication
Textile & Leather
Chemical & Plastic
Wood & Paper
Other Basic Metals
Fabricated Metals
Vehicles
Publishing
Food & Tobacco
Furniture & NEC
Wholesale
Machinery & Optics
Construction
1 2 3 4 5
mean 95% conf. int.
(b) by sector
Notes: The bars show the average score in a given country (a) or 3-digit sector (b). Bootstrapped confidence bands are calculated at the 95%
level. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
The answers to this question were translated into an ordinal ‘vulnerability score’ (VS) on a scale from
1 to 5. Analysts were instructed to assign a score of 5 if the manager expected the plant to be closed
completely, and a score of 1 if the manager expected no detrimental impacts at all. A score of 3 was
given if the manager expected that at least 10% of production and/or employment would be outsourced
in response to future policies. Scores of 2 or 4 were given to account for intermediate responses.
VS across all firms in the sample has a mean of 1.87 and a standard deviation of 1.29. ETS
firms expect a significantly higher impact of 2.14 than non-ETS firms (1.49). Inspection of the raw
data suggests that carbon pricing will affect German and French and Polish firms more strongly than
British, Belgian and Hungarian firms (cf. Figure 1a). However, in no country does the 95%-confidence
band include outsourcing of more than 10% of production in response to regulation. Looking across
different industries, fuels and other minerals, glass, iron & steel are the most vulnerable (cf. Figure
1b). In all other industries, the average VS is rather low. In no industry do we find that plant closure
and complete relocation are in the 95% confidence interval.11
In further results, reported in Table A.5 in the appendix, we show that only French firms expect
significantly stronger-than-average impacts after controlling for industrial composition and interview
noise.12 Hence the bulk of the heterogeneity in the responses is driven by sectoral differences. Again
controlling for interview noise, we find that other minerals, glass, iron & steel, and cement are the
most vulnerable industries, irrespective of employment size. Other energy intensive industries such as
food & tobacco, fabricated metals, and vehicles are significantly less vulnerable than the average.
3.1.2 Validity of the vulnerability score
Given the importance of the VS measure for the analysis to follow, we now describe key aspects
of the interview design and the sampling procedure which help to minimize potential sources of bias.
Additionally, we present evidence that our measure is internally valid, based on other interview results,
and that it is externally valid, based on energy price elasticities of employment in a large sample of
firms in Europe and other OECD countries.
11Figure A.1 in the appendix shows the full distribution of the vulnerability score, by country and industry. Summary
statistics are reported in Table A.4.
12The set of interview noise controls is described in the next subsection.
6
Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk
Interview design We adopt a survey tool based on structured telephone interviews pioneered by
Bloom and van Reenen (2007) and designed to avoid several sources of bias common in conventional
surveys (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Unlike other survey formats, the interviewer engaged the
interviewee in a dialog with specific questions for discussion.13 On the basis of this dialog, the inter-
viewer then assessed the company along various aspects of management relevant for climate policy,
including VS. We provided exemplary responses that interviewers could consult when in doubt about
giving a high versus a medium or low score for the relevant dimension. The goal was to benchmark
the practices of firms according to common criteria. For instance, rather than asking the manager for
a subjective assessment of the management’s awareness of climate change issues we gauged this by
how formal and far-reaching the discussion of climate change topics was in current management.
As in Bloom and van Reenen (2007), the interview process was “double blind”. Interviewees were
not told that their answers would be scored, so as to avoid giving them an incentive to provide biased
information. Conversely, interviewers were given no information about the firm except the contact
details,14 so as to minimize the chance that the interviewer’s preconceptions about the firm could
influence the scoring process (see also Bloom and van Reenen, 2010).
For consistency checks of interviewer scoring, a subset of randomly selected interviews were
double-scored by a second team member who listened in. In the regression analysis below, we control
for possible bias on the part of the interviewers by including interviewer fixed effects. In addition we
control for interview noise due to the manager’s characteristics – by including the tenure in the com-
pany, dummies for gender and professional background (technical or law) – and due to the time of the
interview – by including dummies for month, day of week and time of day (am/pm).
Random sampling Our sampling frame comprised all manufacturing firms with more than 50 but
less than 5,000 employees contained in ORBIS for the countries under study. Out of a total of 44,605
such firms, possible interview partners were drawn at random and contacted via phone until an inter-
view was given or explicitly denied. We oversampled EU ETS firms by drawing firms at random from
the EU ETS registry so that between 50% and 70% of managers contacted in each country worked
at an EU ETS firm. In total, we contacted 1,451 firms in the six countries and interviewed 761 of
them (131 firms in Belgium, 140 in France, 138 in Germany, 69 in Hungary, 78 in Poland, and 209
in the UK). Of all firms we interviewed, 446 (57%) were in the EU ETS. In spite of a relatively high
response rate of 53%, sample selection bias might arise if interviewed firms differ in systematic ways
from firms that declined to be interviewed. We compare the principal firm characteristics available in
the ORBIS database – turnover, employment and capital – between firms interviewed and not inter-
viewed, conditional on a firm’s participation in the EU ETS. These comparisons are reported in Section
A.1.2 of the Appendix and show no statistically significant evidence of sample selection on observable
characteristics.
Internal validity Table 1 shows that VS correlates in expected ways with other interview responses
that also capture vulnerability to carbon pricing in some way but may be deemed less subjective. A
low VS is strongly associated with a high cost pass-through as well as with a low share of non-EU
competitors. Both circumstances enable firms to pass the cost of carbon pricing on to their customers
and thus help to protect them against the detrimental effects of carbon pricing. Moreover, we find a
strong positive association between VS and a number of management practices relevant for climate
change, such as the setting, monitoring and enforcement of targets for energy consumption or GHG
emissions, as well as process innovation in areas related to climate change. This is plausible as the
firms most adversely affected by carbon pricing have stronger incentives to monitor and reduce their
13See Anderson et al. (2011) for a comprehensive list of questions asked.
14Given our focus on medium-sized firms, the graduate students conducting the interviews were unlikely to have prior
knowledge about the firm they were interviewing.
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Table 1: Correlations between vulnerability score and other interview variables
(1) (2)
All firms EU ETS firms
Cost pass-through (%) -0.107*** -0.109*
Share of non-EU competitors (%) 0.141*** 0.135**
Non-EU competitors 0.02 -0.06
Total competitors 0.02 -0.14
Share of sales exported to non EU (%) -0.08 -0.03
Customers are other businesses (D) 0.105*** 0.166***
Multinational firm (D) 0.01 -0.06
CC related products (S) 0.01 0.01
CC related product innovation (S) -0.02 -0.04
CC related process innovation (S) 0.132*** 0.108*
Energy monitoring (S) 0.169*** 0.179***
Greenhouse gas monitoring (S) 0.168*** 0.1
Energy consumption targets (S) 0.074* 0
Greenhouse gas targets (S) 0.207*** 0.160***
Enforcement of targets (S) 0.120*** 0.1
Employment 0.02 -0.06
EU ETS firm (D) 0.623***
Notes: Coefficients of correlation between the vulnerability score and other interview variables. Variables refer to numbers unless indicated
otherwise; D denotes a dummy variable and S another interview score constructed in a way similar to the vulnerability score. CC stands for
“climate change”. Results in column 1 are based on the full sample wheras those in column 2 are calculated using only firms in the EU ETS.
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
carbon intensity and permit liability. When the sample is restricted to include only EU ETS firms,
similar qualitative findings emerge although the statistical significance on some of the management
variables is lower. In sum, these results establish the internal validity of VS as a measure of the firm’s
vulnerability to carbon pricing.
External validity If VS is a valid measure of a firm’s propensity to outsource jobs in response to
higher carbon prices, one would expect that they respond to higher energy prices in a similar fashion.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate the elasticity of employment with respect to energy prices using
more than 500,000 firm-year observations from ORBIS. We estimate a separate elasticity coefficient
for firms in vulnerable sectors, defined as those for which the average employment-weighted VS is
above the median, and test whether it is negative in a statistically significant way.
The regression equation is estimated in first-differences and includes a full set of country-year
effects. This controls for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and transitory shocks at the macro
level, respectively. Table 2 reports the elasticity estimates based on data on manufacturing firms for
the years 1999 through 2007, separately for a sample of 24 OECD countries and a sample of 18
EU countries.15 In addition to OLS estimates, the table reports IV estimates where we instrument
for the energy price variable and its interaction with the “High VS” dummy using the corresponding
variables in levels, lagged either once or twice. This corrects for bias that arises if energy prices are
predetermined or endogenous, respectively.16
15The EU sample includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In addition to those countries,
the OECD sample includes Canada, Mexico, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States of America, but not
Romania.
16For example, energy prices are pre-determined if firms adjust their employment because they anticipate a future change
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Table 2: Estimating the energy-price elasticity of employment in vulnerable sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
European Union OECD
 Δln(Energy price)*(High VS) -0.057*** -0.242*** -2.426*** -0.052*** -0.237*** -1.763***
(0.009) (0.041) (0.320) (0.008) (0.033) (0.242)
Δln(Energy price) 0.035*** 0.065*** 1.354*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.694***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.265) (0.005) (0.013) (0.200)
High VS -0.007 -0.180** -1.066*** 0.070 0.030 -0.172***
(0.024) (0.080) (0.157) (0.071) (0.051) (0.061)
Number of firms 93,831 93,831 93,831 129,867 129,867 129,867
Number of observations 407,905 407,905 407,905 516,128 516,128 516,128
0.039 0.727 0.718 0.034 0.695 0.682
Method OLS IV (1 lag) IV (2 lags) OLS IV (1 lag) IV (2 lags)
Δln(Employment)
R-squared (OLS and 1st stage)
Notes: The dummy variable “High VS” equals one for firms in sectors for which the employment-weighted vulnerability score (VS) exceeds
the sector median. Regressions also include a full set of country-year effects as well as interactions thereof with “High VS (not reported).
For a predefined set of countries, the dataset contains all ORBIS firms with more than 10 employees. The OECD sample comprises 24
OECD countries listed in Appendix A.2. In columns 1 to 3, non-EU countries are excluded from the sample and Romania is included. IV
regressions instrument for ∆ log(energy price) and ∆ log(energy price)·(High VS) using their respective levels, lagged once (cols. 2, 5) or
twice (cols. 3, 6). Reported R-squared refers to OLS regressions and first-stage regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm
level, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
The OLS estimates imply that firms in sectors with low VS increase employment by 3.5% in
response to a doubling of energy prices. In contrast, firms in sectors with high VS would reduce
employment by 2.2% in the EU sample and by 1.8% in the full sample if energy prices doubled.
These effects are small but statistically significant at the 1% level. While the IV estimations give rise
to much larger point estimates, both instrumenting strategies confirm that increases in energy prices
are more detrimental to employment in sectors with a high average VS score. In sum, these results
provide robust evidence that the VS measure derived from the interviews adequately captures the risk
of outsourcing associated with energy price increases and hence higher carbon prices.
3.2 Economic performance
Balance-sheet data on firm performance and other characteristics are obtained from ORBIS. Table 3
summarizes selected variables for the sample of 761 firms we interviewed. The sample is well stratified
with respect to age, size, profitability, and ownership. Table A.3 in the appendix compares the sample
means of each characteristic between firms in the EU ETS with those that are not and reports the
results from a test of equality group means. This reveals that EU ETS firms are older, larger and
more profitable than their counterparts outside the EU ETS, and that these differences are statistically
significant.
3.3 Carbon emissions
Data on carbon emissions and permit allocations for all EU ETS firms in the sample are calculated as
the average, respectively, of verified emissions and allocated permits between 2005 and 2008 obtained
from CITL. We aggregate these installation-level variables up to the firm level before matching them
to ORBIS.
EU ETS firms interviewed by us are sampled either from ORBIS or from the CITL. They are sub-
sequently matched to the CITL or ORBIS, by hand (in the case of Germany, Hungary and the UK)
or using lookup tables available in the public domain (in the case of France, Belgium and Poland).
in the energy price. Energy prices are endogenous if shocks to employment impact on contemporaneous energy prices as
well. See Section A.2 in the appendix for a description of the data and methods used.
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Table 3: Firm characteristics
Percentiles
Mean
Firm
    Age (years) 37 37 7 22 87 736
    Turnover (EUR million) 477.69 2,790.11 9.79 77.20 728.37 696
    Number of employees 1,004 3,891 84 298 1,890 699
    EBIT (EUR million) 17.18 78.25 -1.85 2.31 41.65 683
    Number of shareholders 2 5 1 1 3 761
    Number of subsidiaries 4 24 0 1 8 761
Firm's Global Ultimate Owner
    Turnover (USD million) 23,800 54,100 176 5,948 57,500 241
    Number of employees 46,804 72,634 492 15,211 107,299 226
Standard 
deviation Obs.10th 50th 90th
Notes: EBIT: Earnings Before Interests and Taxes. Interview data sample of 761 firms. Figures correspond to the year 2007. Source: ORBIS
(Bureau Van Dijk).
This also allows us to assign firms in the CITL to 4-digit NACE industrial sectors. To match firms and
countries that are not included in our interviews or in official lookup tables, we draw on a mapping
from CITL to ORBIS by Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2012).17 This allows us to match 75% of CITL
installations and emissions to ORBIS firms. NACE rev 1.1 classification and employment data is avail-
able for 4,254 firms, 71% of which are manufacturing firms. Table A.7 of the appendix summarizes
the correspondence between sectoral classifications.
3.4 The EU Commission’s definitions and data
The EC aims to exempt the most vulnerable firms from permit auctioning, but takes a ‘top-down’
approach to evaluating their vulnerability. Exemptions will be granted at the sector level, based on
carbon (CI) and trade (TI) intensities computed by the EC in its Impact Assessment (IA) Report (EU
Commission, 2009).18 CI is measured as the sum of the direct and indirect costs of permit auctioning,
divided by the gross value added of a sector.19 The logic behind CI is that it proxies for the cost burden
imposed by full auctioning. The direct costs are calculated as the value of direct CO2 emissions (using
a proxy price of 30C/tCO2). The indirect costs capture the exposure to electricity price rises that are
inevitable on account of full permit auctioning in the power sector.20
The TI criterion is defined as “the ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus
the value of imports from third countries and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover
plus total imports from third countries” (EU Commission, 2009, p. 24). Both CI and TI figures are
available at the NACE 4-digit level from the EU Commission (2009).21 Using the methodology and the
same databases from EUROSTAT as in the IA, we also compute sectoral import and export intensity
figures, as well as calculate trade intensities with different regions of the world.
17We thank Rafael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre for graciously providing us with NACE code identifiers and employ-
ment data based on their mapping. The match comprises 5,037 firms (9,061 installations) with a total of 1,743 million tons
of CO2.
18See Juergens, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Vasa (2012) for a detailed explanation of the these calculations. Clò (2010) provides
a critical appraisal.
19Others, such as Sato et al. (2007) have referred to this ratio as “Value at Stake” (VaS).
20They are calculated as electricity consumption (in MWh) multiplied by the average emission intensity of electricity
generation in the EU27 countries (0.465 tCO2/MWh), and applying the same proxy price for an European Union Allowance
of 30C/tCO2.
21NACE stands for "Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européene" (Statistical
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community).
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Figure 2: Sectors exempt from permit auctions
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Notes: The figure shows a scatter plot of the carbon and trade intensities of 4-digit (NACE 1.1) manufacturing industries, based on the full
ORBIS-CITL match. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of firms in a given industry. Sectors in areas A, B, and C will
continue to be exempt from permit auctions in EU ETS phase III.
The EC uses a combination of thresholds for CI and TI to determine if a sector is at risk of carbon
leakage and hence eligible for free permit allocation. Sectors are considered at significant risk of car-
bon leakage if their CI is greater than 5% and their TI is greater than 10%, or either CI or TI is greater
than 30%. For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, we subdivide eligible sectors accordingly into
three mutually exclusive categories: A – high carbon intensity (CI>30%), B – high trade intensity and
low to moderate carbon intensity (CI≤30% ∩ TI>30%), and C – moderate carbon and trade intensities
(5%<CI≤30% ∩ 10%<TI≤30%).
Figure 2 plots the location of 3-digit sectors in a diagram with CI on the vertical and TI on the horizon-
tal axis.22 This shows that a large number of sectors are in category B, meaning that they are exempt
because their TI is higher than 30%. Figure 3 displays the relative size of the exemption category in
terms of their share in the number of firms, employment and CO2 emissions. By all these measures,
category B turns out to be the largest group of exempted firms.23
The share of CO2 emissions that is not exempt from auctioning varies, depending on the CO2
emissions measure used. Based on CITL data we arrive at a figure of 15% whereas the IA data suggest
a share of about 27%, as shown in Figure 3. It is likely that the true value lies somewhere in between
these figures, due to the way they are computed.24 The IA figures count CITL emissions for regulated
22The visualization of the exemption criteria by Clò (2010) is similar but does not show the size of sectors for lack of a
match to firm-level data.
23Figure A.3 in the appendix compares the size of these groups across different samples, namely (a) all EU ETS firms in
the CITL/ORBIS matched sample, (ball such firms in the six countries where we interviewed firms, and all EU ETS firms we
interviewed. This results in similar distributions and confirms that our interview sample is representative of the underlying
population.
24 In fact, Juergens, Barreiro-Hurlé, and Vasa (2012) arrive at an intermediate value of 23% after backing out figures on
direct emissions from the sectoral CI calculations by the EC. They argue that this number is based not only on CITL and IA
data but also on confidential data on CO2 emissions which the member states made available to the EC.
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Figure 3: Relative size of the exemption groups
Notes: The chart displays the relative size of each category of EU ETS sectors defined by the exemption criteria. Category B (very trade
intensive sectors) is subdivided into low and moderate carbon intensity. The sample includes the 4,254 manufacturing firms participating
in the EU ETS and matched to ORBIS. The first bar indicates the category’s share of firms, the second bar its share in employment, and
the third and fourth bars its share in CO2 emissions, based on surrendered permits data from the CITL and sectoral emissions from the EU
Impact Assessment (IA), respectively.
sectors, but also emissions from sectors and firms that are currently not regulated by the EU ETS.
Since the EU ETS was designed primarily to cover energy intensive sectors and installations, non-
regulated sectors and firms tend to have lower CI values and hence fall into the non-exempt category.25
Therefore, emissions by sectors covered in the IA data and not in the CITL data are likely to increase
the estimated share of emissions that are not exempt from auctioning.
4 Empirical analysis of EU criteria and alternatives
4.1 Assessing the EU criteria
We wish to evaluate whether or not the EU criteria (TI and CI) are indeed good proxies to capture
the risk of carbon leakage or job losses. The vulnerability score derived from the interview responses
lends itself to this exercise as it provides a direct measure of what the EC can only approximate by
using TI and CI . Thus, if the EU criteria of the EC are accurate one would expect them to be positively
correlated with VS. We implement this test in the regression
VSi,s = β0+βTTIs+βCCIs+x′i,sβx+ εi,s (1)
where VSi,s is the vulnerability score of firm i in sector s, T Is and CIs are the EC’s trade and carbon
criteria at the sector level, and xi,s is a vector of country dummies and interview noise controls.
Table 4 summarizes the results of this regression. In the univariate specifications, we find a strong
positive association of vulnerability with CI but no statistically significant association with TI. This
result is robust when both measures are included in a quadratic form that is better suited to capture
possible effects of interactions and non-linearities. For instance, trade exposure could matter for very
high values of TI only, or only when it coincides with high CI. There is no evidence of such effects.
Weighting the regression equation (1) by employment does not change the qualitative findings but gives
rise to a larger estimate for the impact on CI.26 This suggests that CI is a particularly good measure
of the risk of downsizing among large firms. In sum, our regression-based test reveals that TI is not a
good indicator to measure the risk of downsizing or outsourcing whereas CI is.
25The EU ETS was designed to cover CO2 emissions from large emitters in the heat and power generation industry (i.e.
installations with a rated thermal input of more than 20MW) and in selected energy intensive industrial sectors.
26Employment values used here and in the remainder of the paper are obtained from ORBIS and averaged over the years
2005 through 2008.
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Table 4: Vulnerability score and exemption criteria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vulnerability Score (VS)
Sectoral Trade Intensity (TI) -0.012 0.050 0.051 0.097
(0.092) (0.112) (0.096) (0.117)
Carbon Intensity (CI) 0.229*** 0.454** 0.292*** 0.473***
(0.063) (0.215) (0.090) (0.114)
TI X TI -0.037
(0.037)
CI X CI 0.007
(0.074)
TI X CI 0.059 0.086 0.063
(0.106) (0.091) (0.134)
Weights no no no no employment
Observations 392 392 392 392 392
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 to 4 and Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression in column 5. The dataset is a cross-section of 392
interviewed firms that are part of the EU ETS and for which CITL, sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. The dependent
variable is the vulnerability score of the firm given by the interviews data. In column 5, the score is weighted by the firm’s employment.
As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity and TI trade intensity which are calculated using data from Eurostat and the EU
Commission. X indicates that two variables are interacted. All regressions include a constant, interview noise controls and country dummies
(not reported). Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
Table 5: Vulnerability score and exemption categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vulnerability Score Vulnerability Score>2
CI>30 (A) 1.032*** 1.015*** 1.996*** 0.714*** 1.704***
(0.303) (0.312) (0.523) (0.242) (0.448)
0.225
(0.258)
0.122 0.139 0.358 0.105 0.271
(0.248) (0.240) (0.241) (0.233) (0.292)
0.596* 1.031*** 0.500** 1.267***
(0.316) (0.322) (0.252) (0.417)
-0.053 0.056 -0.059 0.121
(0.243) (0.329) (0.233) (0.389)
Constant 1.623*** 1.572*** 1.426
(0.516) (0.523) (0.912)
Weights no no employment no employment
Observations 392 392 392 392 392
TI>30 ∩  CI<30 (B)
10<TI<30 ∩  5<CI<30 (C) 
B ∩  CI>5
B ∩  CI<5
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2, WLS in column 3 and Probit regressions in columns 4 and 5. The dataset is a cross-section of
392 interviewed firms that are part of the EU ETS and for which CITL, sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. The dependent
variable is the vulnerability score (on a scale of 5) of the firm given by the interviews data in regressions 1 to 3, and a dummy indicating
whether the score is higher than 2 in regressions 4 and 5. In columns 3 and 5, the firm’s employment is used to weight the regression. CI
indicates carbon intensity and TI trade intensity, calculated using data from Eurostat and the EU Commission. Based on these, dummies are
constructed to represent belonging to categories A, B and C, as well as (B ∩ CI>5) and (B ∩ CI<5). These are used as explanatory variables.
Columns 4 and 5 report marginal effects of the probit regressions. All regressions include a constant, interview noise controls and country
dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10% (*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level.
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It could be argued that the continuous relationship between VS, CI and TI imposed in equation 1
is not appropriate for the EC’s threshold based approach. We thus modify equation (1) to include a
set of dummy variables representing the exemption categories (A,B,C) defined above instead of the
continuous variables TI and CI. The reference category in the new regression is thus given by firms
that are not exempt from auctioning. The results are reported in the first column of Table 5. Only
the very carbon intensive group (A) has an average VS significantly higher than the reference group.
While the average VS in this group is below 3 (which means a reduction of at least 10% in production
or employment due to outsourcing) the 95%-confidence band includes the value 3, albeit by a small
margin. Thus even in group A there is no dramatically high risk of downsizing or outsourcing for the
average firm.
Given that most free permits will be handed out to sectors not in group A, the efficiency of the
allocation scheme could be enhanced if the threshold values for exempting sectors from auctioning
were changed or if exemption criteria were modified so as to better reflect the actual risk of carbon
leakage. The next section proposes two simple modifications to the EU criteria along those lines.
4.2 Two simple improvements
4.2.1 Intensity thresholds
The above results suggest that handing out free permits to prevent carbon leakage is justified only for
sectors in category A, whereas all others should be subject to auctioning. However, category B is very
heterogeneous. While most sectors in this category are not carbon intensive at all (CI < 5), there is
a small number of sectors with intermediate CI (5 < CI < 30), cf. Figure 2. In order to account for
this heterogeneity, we further subdivide category B into a group with low CI (B∩CI < 5) and one with
intermediate CI (B∩CI > 5). As can be seen in Figure 3, the least carbon intensive sectors in group B
(B∩CI < 5) account for a larger share of firms, employment and CO2 emissions than the sectors with
intermediate CI (B∩CI > 5).27
When these separate groups are included along with groups A and C in regression equation (1),
the more carbon-intensive sectors in group B exhibit a significantly higher risk of outsourcing than the
reference group, even though, as is the case for group A, the risk of downsizing or closure does not
attain dramatically high levels for the average firm (cf. columns 2 and 3 of Table 5). This result holds
up when the regression is weighted by employment. In fact, the coefficient estimates on groups A and
B∩CI > 5 both become stronger, indicating that some of the larger firms in those categories are at a
higher risk. In order to account for the qualitative difference between a slight increase in downsizing
risk and a strong downsizing impact, we also estimate Probit regressions of the binary event that a firm
has a VS of 3 or larger. The results, reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5, confirm that only groups
A and B∩CI > 5 present some risk of downsizing.
4.2.2 Trade intensity definition
The evidence shows that the TI criterion is of limited value in proxying a sector’s actual downsizing
risk. One reason for this could be that this indicator is not precise enough to capture how exposure to
international markets might affect downsizing risk. For example, being exposed to competition from
China might affect a firm’s competitiveness in a very different way than does competition from Aus-
tralia. Moreover, being export intensive could have different implications than being import intensive.
In order to explore whether a refined TI measure would give a better indicator of carbon leakage risk,
27The ranking for emissions emerges from the IA figures. CO2 emissions based on the CITL-ORBIS suggest the opposite.
The difference is due to the fact that the ORBIS-CITL match was more challenging in the low CI group (B∩CI < 5), which
is comprised of many sectors and firms, with the result that emissions of unmatched firms are not included in the total figure
for that group.
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Table 6: Regressions of the vulnerability score on CI and region specific TI
(1) (2) (3)
Vulnerability Score
Sectoral Carbon Intensity (CI) 0.234*** 0.547*** 0.551***
(0.060) (0.169) (0.166)
Sectoral Trade Intensity (TI) 0.376** 0.695*** 1.454***
      with LESS developed countries (0.164) (0.232) (0.245)
TI with LEAST developed countries -0.228*** -0.422*** -0.740***
(0.076) (0.157) (0.174)
TI with Developed non-EU countries 0.117 -0.216 -0.593***
(0.125) (0.243) (0.219)
TI with EU countries -0.229** -0.411*** -0.680***
(0.114) (0.143) (0.190)
Quadratic terms no yes yes
Interaction terms no yes yes
Weights no no employment
Observations 389 389 389
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2. WLS regression in column 3. The dataset is a cross section of 389 interviewed firms that are
part of the EU ETS and for which CITL data, carbon intensity data and geographically precise sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are
available. Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*),
5%(**) and 1%(***) level. Includes a constant, country dummies and interview noise controls (not reported). The dependent variable is the
vulnerability score of the firm given by the interviews data. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity and TI trade intensity
which are calculated from Eurostat and the EU Commission data.
we regress VS on CI and four separate measures of the intensity of trade with (i) least developed coun-
tries (according to the UN classification), (ii) less developed (or developing) countries including China
and India, (iii) developed-non EU countries and (iv) EU countries.
Table 6 summarizes the main results of these regressions. . Column 1 reveals a strong positive as-
sociation between vulnerability and TI with less developed countries, which includes China and other
countries that compete with European manufacturing firms and tend to have less stringent environmen-
tal regulation standards. The relationship between vulnerability and TI with least developed countries
is negative and significant. This could reflect the lack of competition presented by firms in such coun-
tries as they tend to export agricultural products and natural resources rather than manufactured goods.
High TI with EU countries is negatively associated with the VS. This is consistent with firms antici-
pating that their EU competitors will be subject to the same policy constraints. The findings obtained
in the quadratic form, which includes interactions of TI with CI and squared terms, are qualitatively
similar (column 2).28 The weighted regression shows that especially the large firms in sectors that
have a high TI with less developed countries are relatively more at risk of downsizing (column 3). The
coefficients on TI with other regions are negative.
In similar regressions (reported in Table A.9 of the appendix), we decomposed the EC’s overall TI
measure into export intensity and import intensity. This did not yield more significant results than for
the overall TI measure. After differentiating trade intensities by region as above, we found that exports
and imports to less developed countries are both positively associated with VS.
28In addition, TI with other developed countries outside the EU only matters in interaction with high CI, in which case
vulnerability is lower. Conversely, the negative link between vulnerability and TI for the least developed countries is partially
offset for the most carbon intensive firms. See Table A.8 in the Appendix for the coefficients on all interaction and squared
terms.
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Table 7: Shares of emissions exempt from auctioning
72.3% 84.8%
32.9% 48.9%
51.7% 73.9%
833.98 748.19
Impact Assessment Data   
Direct Emissions
CITL/ORBIS  Data  
Verified Emissions 
Current EU criteria (A, B and C)
A and B & CI>5
A, B and C – but TI with less developed countries only
Total emissions from non-power sectors [MtCO
2
 eq]
Notes: Each row reports the share of manufacturing emissions exempt from auctioning under a different rule. A, B and C refer to the EU
criteria defined in Section 3.1. The third row uses trade intensity (TI) with less developed countries in the definition of groups B and C.
Column 1 uses data from the EU Impact Assessment for sectors that are also included in the ORBIS-CITL match. Column 2 uses data
from the ORBIS-CITL match. A conservative estimate of total manufacturing emissions in CITL is computed as the sum of emissions from
matched manufacturing firms and emissions of unmatched installations that are not in the combustion sector of CITL, as this would include
primarily (but not exclusively) power plants. MtCO2eq stands for million metric tons of CO2 equivalent.
4.3 Foregone auction revenue
On balance, the evidence presented thus far suggests that sectors at risk of carbon leakage are either
(i) very carbon intensive or (ii) very trade-intensive and moderately carbon intensive or (iii) very trade
intensive vis-à-vis less developed countries such as China. This is suggestive of how the efficiency of
permit allocation could be improved with minimal changes to the definitions and criteria established
by the EC. If exemptions from full auctioning were granted only to groups A and B∩CI > 5 but not
to groupC, the amount of overall emission permits that could be auctioned would increase by 36 to 39
percentage points, depending on which CO2 measure is used (cf. Table 7).29 Whilst having a minimal
impact on leakage risk, this modification would generate additional revenue for governments. They
could use these for example to fund infrastructure or R&D relevant for GHG abatement as well as to
compensate lower income groups for the likely regressiveness of higher energy prices due to carbon
pricing. For a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the increase in government revenue due to this
change, we consider
∆Revenue= ∆(CO2 share not exempt) · (CO2)Manu f acturing ·AF ·PCO2 .
That is, we first multiply the change in the share of non-exempt emissions by total manufacturing
emissions in the EU ETS to get the amount of emissions not exempt from auctioning any longer. To
translate this into a revenue estimate, we need to make assumptions regarding (i) the auctioning factor
(AF), which specifies the share of emissions in the non-exempt sector actually auctioned and (ii) the
allowance price PCO2 .In keeping with the Carbon Leakage IA Report (EU Commission, 2009), we
assume an auctioning factor of 0.75 and an allowance price of C30.30 This leads to an estimate of
C6 billion when using the emission shares based on the CITL-ORBIS match and C7.4 billion when
using shares based on the IA figures. Since actual emissions are likely in between CITL-ORBIS and
IA figures, we choose the midpoint of C6.7 billion as our preferred estimate.
The second proposal, i.e. maintaining the exemption categories but using TI with less developed
countries rather than the general TI measure of the EC, would lead to savings of between C1.8 billion
based on the CITL-ORBIS data and C3.8 billion when using the IA figures. The mid-point is C2.8
billion. While these revenue estimates are subject to intrinsic uncertainty about future carbon emissions
and allowance prices, their order of magnitude makes it clear that the EU is prepared to hand out profit
subsidies to polluting firms on an enormous scale without getting anything in return.
It is worth noting that, even after changing the TI criterion or splitting up group B, there still
remains much heterogeneity in the policy impact within groups. Each of the groups defined on the
29Table A.10 in the appendix lists all sectors we suggest the EC not exempt from auctioning.
30Directive 2009/29/EC stipulates that free permit allocation in non-exempt sectors will fall linearly from 80% of bench-
mark emissions in 2013 to 30% in 2020. The AF of 0.75 results for 2013-2014 when these rules are combined with the
estimated amount of emissions exceeding the benchmark, cf. EU Commission (2009, p. 8).
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basis of the CI and TI thresholds contains some firms with the highest VSs and others that report no
impact of future policy at all (cf. Figure A.4 in the Appendix). This implies that much could be gained
by a more fundamental overhaul of the criteria that exempt firms from auctioning. Regardless of how
well sector-level criteria for free allocation are defined, the efficiency of these allocations could be
improved if vulnerable firms were targeted directly instead of targeting the entire industry. The next
section will explore this idea in more detail.
5 Optimal permit allocation
5.1 The model
In a cap-and-trade scheme, the permit price is determined by the total cap and the marginal cost sched-
ules of all regulated firms. Therefore, the way in which the total cap is allocated across firms should
have no bearing on marginal production decisions. However, permit allocation directly affects firm
behavior at the extensive margin through its impact on firm profits. This section develops a simple nor-
mative model of permit allocation where the government’s principal concern is to avoid the relocation
of production and jobs to places where carbon regulation is less stringent.
5.1.1 Model setup
We consider a firm i that is located in a regulated country and earns a profit of pii(p,qi) which depends
on the number of free permits qi allocated to the firm and on the prevailing permit price p. Since free
permits can be regarded as a lump-sum subsidy to the firm we assume that ∂pii(p,qi)∂qi > 0 ∀ p > 0. By
relocating to an unregulated country f , firm i would obtain profit pii f and incur relocation cost κi. The
firm relocates if pii(p,qi) < pii f −κi. We assume that the government has accurate information on the
firm’s profits at home but cannot observe the net cost of relocation εi ≡ κi−pii f . The government only
knows that εi is an iid random variable with mean µε and standard deviation σε and that it follows a
continuously differentiable distribution function Φi(·). Given the binary relocation variable
yi ≡ 1{εi <−pii(p,qi)} (2)
the government’s assessment of the probability that firm i relocates is thus given by Pr(yi = 1|p,qi) =
Φi [−pii(p,qi)] .
In line with the EC’s official justification for granting compensation to polluting industries, we
assume that the government seeks to minimize the risk of carbon leakage and the risk of domestic job
losses. For individual firm i with free permit allocation qi, this risk is given by
ri(qi) =Φi [−pii(p,qi)] · [αli (p)+(1−α)ei(p)] (3)
where li (p) and ei(p) denote the level of employment and emissions at firm i at permit price p, re-
spectively, and α their relative weight in the government’s risk assessment. Thus, it is assumed that,
when firm i relocates to a non-EU country, all of its jobs are lost and all of its emissions “leak” to
non-regulated countries. In what follows, we take the total cap Q¯ to be exogenously fixed. Therefore,
the carbon price is constant and will be omitted hereafter for ease of notation.31
31The carbon price could vary if relocating firms could sell off their targets. However, in most countries those permits
are revoked and cancelled, so that the stringency of the cap is preserved. There could be an effect on price due to the
different distribution of abatement costs after exit. The direction of this effect is hard to analyze without placing additional
assumptions on the model. Since our primary concern is with the elasticity of profits toward free permit allocation, we leave
this as a topic for future research.
17
Martin, Muûls, de Preux and Wagner
The government chooses how many permits qi to allocate to each firm i so as to minimize aggregate
risk R= ∑ni=1 ri(qi) subject to the sum of allocated permits not exceeding the overall cap Q¯:
min
{qi≥0}
n
∑
i=1
ri(qi) s.t. ∑
i
qi ≤ Q¯. (4)
Given the assumptions onΦi, an additional free permit always brings about a marginal reduction in the
probability of relocation. Hence the shadow price λ of a permit is positive and the permit constraint
holds with equality. The first-order condition for an interior solution is given by
Φ′i [−pii(qi)]
∂pii(qi)
∂qi
[αli+(1−α)ei] = λ ∀i. (5)
Equation (5) requires the regulator to equalize, for each firm, the reduction in expected job losses and
carbon leakage brought about by the last free permit allocated to that firm.
To appreciate the emphasis on the marginal relocation probability, consider two firms with identical
levels of employment and abatement at price pc but with different relocation probabilities. Optimality
requires that the government allocate the bulk of free permits not to the firm with the highest relocation
propensity but rather to the firm where these permits bring about the largest reduction in the relocation
probability, weighted by a convex combination of jobs and emissions at the firm. Although this im-
portant insight follows immediately from straightforward economic reasoning, it seems to have gotten
lost in the heat of the public debate on free permit allocation.
Consider now the dual of program (4) which seeks to minimize the amount of free permits allocated
to the firms subject to the constraint that the risk to jobs and competitiveness does not exceed the level
R¯:
min
qi≥0
n
∑
i=1
qi s.t.
n
∑
i=1
ri(qi)≤ R¯ (6)
It is easily seen that the first-order condition for an interior solution to this program requires that the
impact on risk of the last free permit be equal across all firms receiving positive amounts of permits,
as was shown above for the primal program.
5.1.2 Numerical solution
In solving for the optimal permit allocation we want to allow for firm-specific relocation probability
functions Φi(·) and for corner solutions that can arise when the marginal impact of the first permit on
relocation risk at a firm falls short of its shadow value. We thus use dynamic programming to solve
programs (4) and (6). The structure of the problem is akin to a dynamic ‘cake eating’ problem (see
e.g. Adda and Cooper, 2003), with the difference that the ‘cake’ is not distributed over time but across
firms.
Specifically, given an arbitrary yet fixed ordering of firms the recursive formulation of program (4)
has the Bellman equation
Vi (si) = min
0≤qi≤si
Φi [−pii(qi)] [αli+(1−α)ei]+Vi+1 (si−qi) (7)
where si is the amount of total permits left when reaching firm i in the sequence and Vi+1 (si−qi) is
the value of leaving si−qi permits to all remaining firms in the sequence. It is straightforward to solve
eq. (7) numerically, starting with the last firm N in the sequence whose value function is given by
VN (sN) = Φi [−piN(sN)] [αlN+(1−α)eN ]. For firms earlier in the sequence, we recursively use eq.
(7) to choose the optimal qi for each possible si.32 This approach can be applied to a broad class of
32We implement the dynamic programming algorithm in a STATA ado file using MATA language. The ado file is available
upon request.
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Figure 4: Impact of free allocation on the vulnerability score
Notes: The chart shows the conditional distribution of the reduction in the vulnerability score when firms receive free permits for 80% of
their direct carbon emissions. The conditioning variable is the vulnerability score in the absence of free permits.
specifications for the relocation probability and objective functions. Importantly, it allows us to solve
the dual problem (6) as well. Since Φi (−pii(·)) is strictly monotonic in qi we can invert eq. (3) to get
qi = pi−1i
[
−Φ−1i
(
ri
αli+(1−α)ei
)]
and rewrite the dual program (6) as
min
{ri≥0}
n
∑
i=1
pi−1i
[
−Φ−1i
(
ri
αli+(1−α)ei
)]
s. t.
(
∑
i
ri ≤ R¯
)
. (8)
That is, rather than allocating the pieces of a fixed pie of free permits so as to reduce total risk, we
now allocate the pieces of a fixed pie of relocation risk so as to minimize total permits. The analogue
to Bellman equation (7) is given by
Wi (si) = min
0≤ri≤si
pi−1i
[
−Φ−1i
(
ri
αli+(1−α)ei
)]
+Wi+1 (si− ri) (9)
and can be solved recursively in the same fashion as described above.
5.1.3 Calculating the marginal propensity to relocate
We assume that the unobserved net cost of relocation follows a logistic distribution and consider a
linear approximation to the profit function pii(qi) = δ0i+δ1iqi. This yields the relocation probability
Pr(yi = 1|qi) =Φi (−pii(qi)) = 11+ exp(β0i+β1iqi) (10)
with parameters β0i ≡ δi0+µεσε and β1i ≡
δ1i
σε . We calibrate these parameters for each firm based on the
interview responses. We asked the manager to assess (i) the likely future impact of carbon pricing
on their businesses (cf. Section 3.1.1) and (ii) how this impact would change if the company was
granted permits for 80% of its emissions at no cost. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the change in
vulnerability conditional on the initial VS. For example, the fifth bar represents firms that responded
that climate change policies were likely to force them to close down or relocate. One fifth of these
firms reported that receiving free permits would have no impact on this decision whereas another fifth
reported that this would neutralize any negative impact on domestic production.
To map vulnerability scores into relocation probabilities, we follow the scoring grid in assigning
probabilities of 0.01, 0.10 and 0.99 to scores 1, 3 and 5, respectively. We interpolate between these
numbers and assign probabilities of 0.05 and 0.55 to scores 2 and 4, respectively. For each firm, we
evaluate the relocation probability with no free permits, Pri(yi = 1|qi = 0) as well as with 80% free
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permits Pri(yi = 1|qi = 0.8ei) and use these to back out the parameters β0i = ln
[
1−Pri(yi=1|qi=0)
Pri(yi=1|qi=0)
]
and
β1i = 10.8ei ln
[
1−Pri(yi=1|qi=0.8ei)
Pri(yi=1|qi=0.8ei) −β0i
]
in equation (10).
The marginal impact on firm exit of an additional unit of free permits for firm i is given by
dΦi [−pii(qi)]
dqi
= β1i
−exp(β0i+β1iqi)
[1+ exp(β0i+β1iqi)]2
(11)
which is strictly negative for β1i > 0.33 Since the marginal impact of free permits on the relocation
probability is declining in absolute value, the government should allocate free permits first to firms
with the highest absolute impact of the first free permit, β1i exp(β0i)
[1+exp(β0i)]2
.
5.2 Simulation of counterfactual allocations
We compute optimal allocations under different assumptions about the government’s objective function
(risk vs. cost minimization), about the risk weights (job loss only vs. emission leakage only), and its
ability to allocate free permits (at the firm or sector level).Counterfactual permit allocations provide a
benchmark against which to compare de facto permit allocations such as grandfathering and the EC
proposal. This allows us to precisely identify the efficiency losses associated with the non-optimality
of de facto allocations, either in terms of excessive relocation risk for a given amount of free permits, or
in terms of excessive amounts of free permits given away to achieve a fixed reduction in relocation risk.
Furthermore, we will identify which countries stand to gain from these deviations from optimality.
5.2.1 Minimizing relocation risk
Table 8 reports the minimal relocation risk under the constraint that the total number of free permits
does not exceed the amount handed out under grandfathering or under the EC proposal, and compares
this with the actual risk under these allocations.34 The first row shows that job risk under free allocation
can be reduced from 4.8% to 3.5% of ETS employment when permits are allocated optimally across
firms. This is regardless of the risk criterion used, i.e. there is no trade-off between protecting jobs and
preventing carbon leakage. The EC proposal, however, assigns exemptions from permit auctions in
such a way that the job risk more than doubles to 10.6% of ETS employment. Optimal redistribution
of permits brings the risk back down to the previous level of 3.5%. The new permit constraint is not
binding because many firms that would not change their propensity to relocate if given free permits
are allocated zero permits.
The third row of Table 8 reports the risk of carbon leakage as a share of total emissions covered
by the ETS for the same six allocations. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported for
job risk. Efficient allocation results in a leakage risk of 12.7% for both permit constraints considered,
regardless of whether minimization is with respect to job risk or emission leakage. Differences arise
in the baseline risk, which at 15.1% is higher than the job risk, and in the much smaller increase in
leakage risk of only 2.2 percentage points when going from grandfathering to the EC proposal. This is
because the EC proposal is explicit about exempting carbon intensive sectors from permit auctioning
but does not target employment directly. Again there is no trade-off between these two risk measures;
the allocation that minimizes job risk also achieves minimal leakage risk, and vice versa.
In practice, it might be difficult for the regulator to implement optimal permit allocations at the
firm level. Doing so could provide firms with an incentive to strategically manipulate their reported
impact of free permits on the propensity to relocate. Moreover, one can think of legal and political
33This is the case if allocating more permits for free strictly reduces the relocation probability, i.e. Φi(0)>Φi(0.8ei).
34We do not account for benchmarking but assume that in a sector that is eligible for free permits all firms receive alloca-
tions corresponding to their current emissions.
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Table 8: Risk of job loss and carbon leakage (in %) under various scenarios
Free allocation EC proposal
Program Actual Minimal risk Actual Minimal risk
Risk criterion - Jobs CO2 - Jobs CO2
A. Percentage share of ETS employment at risk
Firm allocation 4.8 3.5 3.5 10.6 3.5 3.5
Sector allocation 4.8 3.9 5.0 10.6 4.0 5.3
B. Percentage share of ETS emissions at risk
Firm allocation 15.1 12.7 12.7 17.3 12.7 12.7
Sector allocation 15.1 15.0 13.8 17.3 17.7 14.4
Notes: Share of jobs (panel A) or CO2 emissions (panel B) at risk of relocation in total employment or emissions across ETS firms in
our sample. Columns 1 and 4 report the risk associated with free allocation and the allocation implied by the EC proposal, respectively.
Relocation risk is minimized either w.r.t. jobs only (α = 1, columns 2 and 5) or to CO2 emissions only (α = 0, columns 3 and 6). Minimized
risk is subject to the constraint that the total number of free permits not exceed the amount under free allocation (columns 2 and 3) or under
the EC proposal (columns 5 and 6). The first row of each panel reports optimal allocations at the firm level and the other row at the sector
level.
obstacles to fully differentiating free permit allocations across firms in different sectors and countries.
It is plausible that such difficulties contributed to the EC’s decision of determining allocation rules at
the 4-digit sector level.
We thus calculate minimal relocation risk under the additional constraint that the government can-
not assign free permits at the firm level but only at the sector level.35 We assume that firms receive
permits according to their share in the sector’s total emissions and aggregate the resulting relocation
risk across firms within sectors. The results in the second and fourth row of Table 8 show that both job
and leakage risks are higher than with firm-level allocations. A moderate trade-off between minimiz-
ing job risk vs. carbon leakage risk arises. The constraints on the number of free permits are binding
now because grandfathering individual firms with a high marginal impact of free permits is more costly
under sector-level allocation as all other firms in the sector must be given free permits as well. Clearly,
those permits are then not available anymore to grandfather more vulnerable firms in other sectors. The
trade-off between jobs and carbon leakage is also evident from the fact that minimization with respect
to one risk criterion may give a worse outcome, in terms of the other criterion, than under sub-optimal
allocations.36
5.2.2 Cost minimization
Minimizing the amount of free permits subject to a given relocation risk can be regarded as the tax
payer’s cost minimization program because it minimizes the amount of foregone auction revenue for
a given outcome. Table 9 displays the share of permits handed out for free under different allocation
schemes. The first row shows that optimal allocation at the firm level gives rise to drastic efficiency
gains. The relocation risk associated with full grandfathering could be achieved by handing out only
between 17.1% and 26.1% of permits for free, depending on whether job risk or carbon leakage risk is
held fixed. Two mechanisms drive this result. First, the majority of firms in our sample report that their
propensity to relocate does not vary with the amount of free permits. It is optimal to assign zero free
35Unlike the EC proposal which either assigns zero free permits or grandfathers the entire sector, we assume that any
non-negative amount of free permits can be allocated to a sector, subject to the constraint on the number of total permits.
36For example, minimizing job risk subject to the total number of permits under the EC proposal leads to 17.7% of
emissions being at risk which is larger than the 17.3% put at risk by the EC proposal. Moreover, minimizing carbon leakage
risk subject to the total number of permits under free allocation results in 5% of jobs at risk, i.e. slightly more than the 4.8%
of jobs at risk when all sectors are grandfathered.
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Table 9: Percentage share of emissions allocated for free
Free allocation EC proposal
Program Actual Minimal cost Actual Minimal cost
Risk constraint - Jobs CO2 - Jobs CO2
Firm allocation 100.0 17.1 26.1 92.6 0.3 21.0
Sector allocation 100.0 28.1 27.6 92.6 15.3 26.0
Notes: Columns 1 and 4 report the share of free permits in total emissions under free allocation and under the EC proposal, respectively.
Minimal cost allocations are calculated subject to the constraint that the total relocation risk not exceed the one under free allocation (columns
2 and 3) or under the EC proposal (columns 5 and 6). Relocation risk is measured in terms of job loss (α = 1, columns 2 and 5) or CO2
emissions leakage (α = 0, columns 3 and 6). Free permits are allocated optimally at the level of the firm (row 1) or sector (row 2).
permits to those firms. Second, among the remaining firms, free permits are allocated in such a way as
to equalize the marginal propensity to relocate, weighted by jobs or carbon emissions, as required by
the first-order condition (5).
Under the EC proposal, a large number of sectors and particularly the carbon-intensive ones will
continue to be exempt from permit auctioning. As a consequence, 92.8% of emissions will continue
to be allocated for free.37 As was pointed out above, the EC proposal propels the job risk to a level
so high that it could be achieved by handing out a mere 0.3% of total permits for free. In contrast,
carbon leakage risk increases only slightly under the EC proposal. Obtaining this level of leakage risk
at minimal cost would still require 21.0% of free permits to be allocated for free.
The second row of Table 9 shows that allocating free permits at the sector level instead of the firm
level is somewhat less efficient. Large changes arise in the allocations that maintain job risk fixed
whereas sector level allocations under fixed carbon leakage risk are almost as cost effective as their
counterparts at the firm level. This is because (i) the EC proposal explicitly targets carbon intensive
sectors and (2) carbon intensive firms get a large weight in the objective function when minimizing
carbon risk. Overall, the simulations show that under no allocation or weighting scheme would it be
optimal to allocate more than 30% of total emissions in the ETS sector for free.
5.3 Distributional implications of the EC proposal
The question of who benefits and who loses out when some sectors are exempted from permit auctions
is politically loaded, especially in times of strained budgets and increasing skepticism about European
integration. Importantly, this question cannot be answered by simply looking at the raw data as this
would fail to control for differences in the propensity to relocate which justify non-uniform allocation
of free permits across firms, sectors and countries. The model developed at the outset of this section
provides us with benchmark permit allocations that take into account both a firm’s extensive-margin
response to permit auctions as well as its contribution to overall relocation risk. This yielded the result
that at least 70% of free permits allocated under the EC proposal can be regarded as a profit subsidy to
the eligible sectors. We now examine the distribution of these excess profits and identify winners and
losers.
5.3.1 Which countries gain?
From a political perspective, this is a first-order question arising in the context of international emis-
sions trading. Panel A of Table 10 reports the amount of emissions exempt from permit auctioning
under the EC Proposal in each country, both in absolute terms and as a share of the country’s total
37This is roughly consistent with the estimate of 84.8% derived in the previous section using a larger sample of firms and
countries.
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Table 10: Country allocations
Belgium France Germany Hungary Poland UK
A. Free permits allocated under the EC proposal (full sample)
Million permits 28.2 77.4 125.5 3.5 40.2 69.0
Share of emissions (%) 92.6 91.6 89.6 80.3 92.0 86.1
Deviation from mean (%) 2.9 1.9 -0.1 -9.5 2.3 -3.6
B. Change (%) in free permit allocation: EC proposal vs. various counterfactuals (interview sample)
Proportional reduction 2.6 -1.3 -0.0 -6.8 2.7 -1.1
Minimal job risk 12.2 -12.4 48.1 9.2 14.1 -17.3
Minimal carbon risk 5.1 -7.4 43.7 -6.5 -2.5 -10.2
Notes: Based on the comprehensive CITL/ORBIS match, Panel A reports the total amount of emissions exempted, the share of exempted
emissions in total emissions and the deviation of that share from the mean share of exempt emissions across the six countries. Panel B is
based on the interview sample and reports the percentage change in a country’s free permit allocation when going from a counterfactual
allocation to the EC proposal. The counterfactual allocations are: a uniform quota of 92.7% of the countries carbon emissions (row 1), the
sector-level allocation that minimizes relocation risk in terms of jobs (row 2) or in terms of CO2 emissions (row 3) under the constraint that
the total number of free permits is the same as under the EC proposal.
manufacturing emissions. These numbers allow for a ‘model-free’ analysis of the distributional im-
plications by calculating the difference between each country’s share of free permits and the average
share across the six countries. That is, we compare the proposed scheme of exempting selected sectors
from permit auctions to a counterfactual uniform reduction of free permit allocations across all sectors.
Row 3 of panel A identifies Belgium, France and Poland as winners whereas all other countries lose
compared to the counterfactual. The largest loss is incurred by Hungary which sees its free allocation
reduced by 9.5 percentage points below the proportional reduction. When we restrict the analysis to
the interview sample, we arrive at qualitatively very similar findings. The first row of panel B reports
the difference in free permits as a percentage of the counterfactual allocation. The only qualitative
change is that France now emerges with a moderate loss instead of a moderate gain.
In spite of its political appeal, the proportional reduction scenario is not an economically relevant
counterfactual to analyze the distributional implications of the EC proposal because countries are not
equally vulnerable to carbon pricing. Rows 2 and 3 of panel B report by how much the EC proposal
differs from permit allocations that minimize the risk of job loss or carbon leakage, respectively, while
holding fixed the aggregate number of free permits. Again, the difference is expressed in percent of
counterfactual allocations. This confirms that Belgium benefits from the EC proposal whereas France
and the UK lose out. Gains and losses in these three countries range between 5.1% and 17.3% (in
absolute value) of the free permits they would have obtained in an optimal scenario. These changes
are dwarfed, however, by the enormous gains reaped by Germany. The EC proposal grants Germany
between 43.7% and 48.1% more free permits than under the allocation minimizing relocation risk,
depending on how jobs and carbon emissions are weighted in the objective function. This striking
result is completely masked in the naive comparison to the proportional cutback. The distributional
effects for Poland and Hungary are ambiguous: they gain compared to an allocation with minimal job
risk but lose with respect to an allocation with minimal carbon leakage risk.
5.3.2 Incidence on Labor
The simulations above establish that free permits under the EC proposal comprise a large profit sub-
sidy that is not justified on the basis of firms’ relocation risk only. There might be other reasons for
subsidizing firms, however. For example, if employment generates positive externalities for society
– by stabilizing pay-as-you-go social security systems, lowering crime and drug abuse, among other
things – then the EC should subsidize labor-intensive firms. In its simplest form, this kind of subsidy
would require that firms receive free permits in proportion to the number of employees, maintaining
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Figure 5: Distribution of subsidies per job
(a) Reference scenarios
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Notes: The figure displays histograms of the distribution of subsidies per job – calculated in C per employee for a permit price of C30 – in
the interview sample, comprised of 398 ETS firms, under various allocations. Subfigure (a) compares the implicit distribution of subsidies
per job under free permit allocation with the distribution resulting from the exemption rules proposed by the European Comission. Subfigure
(b) juxtaposes the distributions of subsidies per job that result from optimal firm-level allocations of free permits where either the job risk or
the carbon leakage risk is fixed at the level implied by the EC proposal.
constant the subsidy per employee across firms.
Figure 5 displays histograms of the distribution of subsidies per job, expressed in C per employee,
under various allocations. We follow the EC’s IA report and assume a permit price of C30 for these
calculations. Figure 5a compares the implicit distribution of subsidies per job under free permit alloca-
tion with the distribution resulting from the exemption rules proposed by the EC. It is clear that neither
of the two allocation schemes distributes subsidies evenly across employees. This should not come
as a surprise because both grandfathering and the EC proposal are designed to give more subsidies to
carbon intensive firms. The degree of inequality is striking. Under free permit allocation, 30% of firms
receive less than C1,000 per worker whereas 18% receive more than C10,000. The combination of
permit auctions and exemption rules proposed by the EC further exacerbates inequality. Almost half
of the firms (44%) receive nothing while excessive subsidies to the top ten firms in our sample remain
unchanged, ranging from C91,651 to C467,016 per worker. The distribution in the full sample is very
similar to the one of the interview sample.38
Figure 5b juxtaposes the distributions of subsidies per job resulting from cost minimal allocations
at the firm level when either the job risk or the carbon leakage risk is held fixed at the level implied by
the EC proposal. While both scenarios allocate no permits to more than 80% of firms, the distribution
of subsidies per job among firms receiving free permits differs quite a lot. When job risk is fixed,
the distribution is fairly uniform across firms, with a maximum subsidy of C1,468 per employee. In
contrast, when carbon leakage risk is fixed the distribution of subsidies per job is more unequal and
inherits some of the excesses of the reference allocations, with implicit transfers to the top ten firms in
the sample ranging from C20,002 to C394,697 per worker. This suggests that including employment
as a criterion for free permit allocation, unlike current criteria based on carbon and trade intensities,
could go a long way to mitigate the striking inequalities in the distribution of the subsidies implied by
free permit allocation.
38In the full sample, 31% of firms receive less than C1,000 per worker whereas 23% receive more than C10,000. Under the
EC rules, 46% will receive nothing while excessive subsidies to the top ten firms remain unchanged, ranging from C423,000
to C2,770,551. The distribution is displayed in Figure A.5 in the appendix.
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Table 11: Feasible optimal allocation rules
Variables Risk criterion
Employment Risk CO2 Risk
Firm-level employment 0.19 0.20 0.20 -0.14 -0.13 -0.16
Firm-level CO2 0.81 0.80 0.80 1.14 1.18 1.19
CI 0.02 0.02 0.29 -0.06 -0.03 0.28
TI less -0.02 -0.02 0.59 0.01 0.10 -0.27
CI X TI less -0.01 0.13 -0.09 0.99
Share of ETS employment at risk 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 5.2% 7.2% 7.5% 7.5% 6.4%
Share of ETS emissions at risk 18.5% 18.4% 18.4% 28.7% 16.2% 16.1% 16.1% 25.6%
Notes: The table reports the parameters of the optimal feasible allocation rule for different vectors of observable variables. The optimality
criterion is minimal risk to jobs (columns 1 to 4) or carbon emissions (columns 5 to 8). The last two rows report the percentage share of EU
ETS employment and CO2 emissions at risk for a given optimal allocation rule. Carbon intensity and trade intensity with less developed
countries (TI less) are defined at the 4-digit level.
5.4 Feasible optimal permit allocation
The previous sections have uncovered several shortcomings of the EC criteria for free permit alloca-
tion. First and foremost, too many sectors with a negligible risk of carbon leakage will be exempted,
particularly due to the trade intensity criterion. Consequently, a large amount of revenue from permit
auctions will be foregone with no corresponding reduction in aggregate relocation risk. Moreover, the
EC criteria fail to protect employment effectively and create strong inequality in the distribution of the
implicit per-job subsidies across firms. This section develops a simple allocation rule for free permits
based on easily observable characteristics of firms and sectors which brings the allocations closer to
the efficiency frontiers derived in the previous section.
Given a total amount of free permits Q¯, an allocation share θi = f (xi;γ) maps a vector xi =
(x1i , . . . ,x
k
i ) of k observable characteristics for firm i into the unit interval. Suppose that the func-
tion f (·) is known up to a parameter vector γ . Upon substituting qˆi = θiQ¯ into the risk minimization
program (4)
min
γ∈Γ
n
∑
i=1
ri
(
f (xi;γ)Q¯
)
s.t.
n
∑
i=1
f (xi;γ) = 1 ∧ f (xi;γ)≥ 0 ∀i. (12)
we obtain the optimal allocation rule by solving for γ . As this can be seen as a constrained version
of the optimization programs considered above, we refer to this as the “feasible optimal allocation”.
We specify an allocation rule based on a Cobb-Douglas function, f (xi;γ) = ∏k(xki )γk/
[
∑ j∏k(xkj)γk
]
where we require that ∑k γk = 1. This is the generalization of a grandfathering allocation rule based on
past emissions ei, where f (ei;γ) =
eγei
∑ j e
γe
j
and γe = 1.39
Table 11 reports the parameter vector γˆ for program (12) with Q¯ equal to the amount of permits
allocated for free under the EC proposal. As above, we minimize relocation risk either in terms of
jobs or carbon emissions. We first consider allocation rules that use only two firm-level variables.
With weighted parameters of 0.19 for employment and 0.81 for emissions, the percentage of ETS
employment at risk drops from 10.6% to 3.57% (column 1). This is very close to the “theoretical”
minimum of 3.5% reported in Table 8 above. For emission leakage risk in column 4 we find that using
an index with a positive weight for emissions of 1.14 and a smaller, negative weight for employment
yields a risk of 16.21%. This is lower than the risk implied by the EC proposal (17.3%), yet the risk
reduction does not get nearly as close to the theoretical minimum (12.7%) as in the case of employment
risk.
39We implement this using a standard maximum likelihood solver where the “likelihood” contribution of observation
(firm) i becomes ri
(
f (xi;γ)Q¯
)
.
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The inclusion of sector-level CI and TI with less developed countries in the allocation rule yields
only very small additional reductions in the minimized objective function for both types of risk.40
Finally, when only sectoral trade and carbon intensities form the basis for the allocation rule, both
risk types increase considerably, to 5.22% in terms of jobs and 25.64%in terms of emissions. All of
this suggests that allocating free permits on the basis of employment size and CO2 emissions alone
provides a very efficient allocation rule for employment.
It is remarkable that the deviation of employment risk from the optimum when minimizing CO2
risk is much larger than the deviation of CO2 risk when minimizing employment risk. It would there-
fore seem that using an allocation rule based on minimizing the risk to jobs would be more likely to
find a general consensus among different stakeholders concerned with either one type of risk, but not
the other. Alternatively, policy makers might also consider a convex combination of both risk types
when deriving the optimal feasible index.
6 Conclusion
The need to compensate industry for the adverse profit impact of regulation has far-reaching con-
sequences for policy design. For example, general-equilibrium effects may change the relative cost
effectiveness of different regulatory instruments when industries are fully compensated for the cost
of complying (Bovenberg et al., 2005, 2008). In this paper, we propose an industry compensation
principle based on the risk that the adverse profit impact triggers a response at the extensive margin:
If profits fall by too much, firms have an incentive to relocate to an unregulated jurisdiction. This is
undesirable for the regulator because relocating firms take with them jobs, taxable profits and – in the
case of climate policy – the very emissions targeted by the regulation. The simple economic logic fol-
lowing from this is that compensation should be distributed across firms so as to equalize the expected
marginal impact of relocation on the regulator’s objective function.
We have applied this idea in the context of the EU ETS, where job losses due to relocation are
aggravated by carbon leakage. Industry compensation is given in the form of free permit allocations,
with the stated objective to prevent relocation and carbon leakage. Our analysis has shown that the
criteria adopted by the EC to establish the risk of carbon leakage give rise to very inefficient allocations.
Optimal allocations yield drastic improvements in relocation risk, and so do simple approximations to
optimal allocations based on only a couple of firm characteristics. What is more, we have estimated
that by even simpler modifications to the EC criteria, European governments could raise up to C6.7
billion every year in additional permit revenues, without increasing the overall downsizing risk. In
view of the economic slump and the debt crises currently prevailing in most European economies,
it seems that the cost – both economic and political – of raising public funds to substitute for these
foregone revenues is much higher than the cost of changing the exemption rules.
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A Appendix
A.1 Background on the management interviews
A.1.1 Interview practice
Interviews were carried out by graduate and postgraduate students after they had been trained. The
interviewers were paid according to the number of interviews conducted, encouraging them to do more
interviews and discouraging any firm background research, thus preserving the double-blind nature of
the survey. Interviewers made “cold calls” to production facilities (not head offices), gave their name
and affiliation and then asked to be put through to the production or environmental manager. In the case
of EU ETS firms, interviewers requested to speak to the person responsible for the EU ETS. At this
stage, the terms “survey” and “research” were avoided as both are associated with commercial market
research and some switchboard operators have instructions to reject such calls. Instead, we told them
that we were doing “a piece of work” on climate change policies and their impact on competitiveness
in the business sector and would like to have a conversation with the manager best informed.
Once the manager was on the phone, the interviewer asked whether s/he would be willing to have a
conversation of about 40-45 minutes about these issues. Depending on the manager’s willingness and
availability to do so, an interview was scheduled. If the manager refused, s/he was asked to provide the
interviewer with another knowledgeable contact at the firm who might be willing to comment. Man-
agers who agreed to give an interview were sent an email with a letter in PDF format to confirm the
date and time of the interview and to provide background information and assure them of confidential-
ity. A similar letter was sent to managers who requested additional information before scheduling an
interview.
All interviewers worked on computers with an internet connection and used VOIP software to
conduct the interviews. They accessed a central interview database via a custom-built, secure web
interface which included a scheduling tool and the interview application which displayed the questions
along with the scoring grid. The interview screen contained hyperlinks to a manual with background
information on each question. Interviewers scored answers during the interview. For all interviews,
the scheduling history as well as the exact time and date, duration, identity of interviewer, etc. were
recorded. All interviews were conducted in the language of the interviewee’s residence.
The interview format follows the design pioneered by Bloom and van Reenen (2007). This ap-
proach seeks to minimize cognitive bias by asking open-ended questions and by delegating the task
of scoring the answers to the interviewer. In addition, a large sample size and interviewer rotation
is exploited to control for possible bias on the part of the interviewers by including interviewer fixed
effects in regression analyses. For further details, see Bloom and van Reenen (2010).
A.1.2 Sample characteristics
Table A.1 provides an overview of the number of interviews and the response rates broken down by
country and by EU ETS participation status.1 The last column shows the response rate i.e. the fraction
of firms that were contacted and with whom we successfully conducted an interview. These vary
somewhat between different countries. For example, it is particularly low in Germany (38%) and the
UK (40%), whereas in Belgium or Hungary, firms were more willing to participate (74% and 78%,
respectively). Generally, these figures are very high compared to response rates achieved in postal or
online surveys.
It is important for the validity of our analysis to rule out possible selection bias in our sample. EU
ETS firms are different from non-ETS firms, but within these two categories, interviewed firms are
1All analysts would first conduct interviews in the UK and only then go on to conduct interviews in another country
allowing a common reference, hence the larger number of interviews for this country. This allows us to control for interviewer
bias as discussed below and also for UK responses to be used as a benchmark.
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Table A.1: Interview response rates by country
Refused
Belgium 134 131 85 46 178 47 0.74
France 141 140 92 48 238 98 0.59
Germany 139 138 95 43 337 199 0.41
Hungary 69 69 37 32 90 21 0.77
Poland 78 78 57 21 140 62 0.56
UK 209 205 63 142 468 264 0.44
Total 770 761 429 332 1451 691 0.52
# of 
Interviews
# of Firms 
Interviewed
 # of ETS 
Firms 
Interviewed
# of Non 
ETS Firms 
Interviewed
Total Firms 
Contacted
Response 
Rate
Notes: There are more interviews than interviewed firms as we conducted several interviews with different partners in a small number of
firms.
not significantly different from non-interviewed firms in regards to the most common characteristics
available in ORBIS. This is shown in Panel A of Table A.2 where each of the principal firm character-
istics available from the ORBIS database (turnover, employment and capital) is regressed on a dummy
variable indicating that a firm is part of the EU ETS, a dummy indicating that a firm was contacted,
and a full set of sector and year dummies, with the result that the estimated coefficients are small and
statistically insignificant. For the set of firms that either conceded or refused an interview, we ran anal-
ogous regressions to estimate an intercept specific to firms that granted us an interview. The results in
Panel B of Table A.2 show that none of these intercepts is statistically significant. We thus conclude
that our sample is representative of the underlying population of medium-sized manufacturing firms in
the six European countries covered by our study.
A.2 Background on energy price regressions
A.2.1 Data
We combine ORBIS data for EU and OECD countries with historical energy prices and the VS. Table
A.6 summarizes the data.
Employment Our sample covers all firms with at least 10 employees contained in the ORBIS database
which provides information on employment and industry at the 3-digit NACE code. The EU sample
includes Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In
addition to those countries, the OECD sample includes Canada, Mexico, Japan, Norway, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United States of America, but not Romania.
Energy prices The ‘Energy Prices and Taxes database ’2 maintained by the International Energy
Agency provides Energy End-Use price data for electricity, gas, liquid and solid fuels for the years
1998-2007. To ensure comparability of prices across fuels we adjust for net calorific value using
prices in US$ per ton of oil equivalent (TOE). We compute the sectoral energy price
Pesct =∑
f
ω fs p
f
ct (A.1)
2International Energy Agency (2009). Energy Prices and Taxes. Quarter 3. Paris, France.
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Table A.2: Sample representativeness
(1) (2) (3)
Turnover
A. All firms
   Firm contacted -0.0322 -0.0794 0.172
(0.0786) (0.0611) (0.108)
   EU ETS firm 2.031*** 1.452*** 2.530***
(0.095) (0.080) (0.145)
   Number of observations 118,874 107,830 113,771
   Number of firms 12,322 12,921 118,874
   R-squared      0.511 0.364 12322
B. Contacted firms
   Firm granted interview -0.0983 -0.0373 0.0443
(0.118) (0.0957) (0.150)
   EU ETS firm 2.044*** 1.547*** 2.540***
(0.124) (0.107) (0.160)
   Number of observations 26,114 23,933 25,815
   Number of firms 1,373 1,420 1,297
   R-squared      0.659 0.589 0.618
Employment Capital 
Notes: Regressions in panel A are based on the set of manufacturing firms with more than 50 employees  
contained in ORBIS for the six countries covered by the survey. Each column shows the results from a regression 
of the ORBIS variable given in the column head on a dummy variable indicating whether a firm was contacted or 
not and a dummy variable indicating whether a firm was taking part in the EU ETS at the time of the interviewing. 
Panel B shows analogous regressions for the set of contacted companies and with an indicator for whether an 
interview was granted. All regressions are by OLS and include country dummies, year dummies and 3-digit sector 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
unknown form.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table A.3: Firm characteristics by ETS participation status
ETS Firms non ETS Firms
Mean Mean
Firm
    Age (years) * 40 37 409 33 37 327
    Turnover (EUR million) ** 725.73 3,611.50 398 146.42 767.93 298
    Number of employees ** 1,418 5,092 394 469 857 305
    EBIT (EUR million) ** 26.12 100.54 391 5.22 23.47 292
    Number of shareholders 2 5 429 3 5 332
    Number of subsidiaries 6 32 429 2 5 332
Firm's Global Ultimate Owner
    Turnover (USD million) 31,695 67,080 142 12,464 21,980 99
    Number of employees 50,012 71,864 131 42,381 73,834 95
Std. Dev. Obs. Std. Dev. Obs.
Notes: Based on 2007 data. Stars next to a variable name indicate that the respective means for ETS and non ETS firms are significantly
different at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of vulnerability score by country and industry
0 20 40 60 80 100
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
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Textile & Leather(20)
TV Communication(11)
Publishing(19)
Other Minerals(8)
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Other Basic Metals(9)
Machinery & Optics(68)
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Glass(29)
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Fabricated Metals(45)
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Chemical & Plastic(118)
Ceramics(13)
Cement(63)
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Notes: Bar charts show the distribution of the vulnerability score by country (left) and by 3-digit NACE sector (right). The score ranges
from 1 (no impact) to 5 (complete relocation). A score of 3 is given if at least 10% of production or employment would be outsourced in
response to future carbon pricing. The number of observations in each country and industry is given in parenthesis. NEC: Not elsewhere
classified.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of the vulnerability score
Mean Min P25 Median P75 Max Firms
Overall vulnerability score 1.87 1.29 1 1 1 3 5 725
A. by country
Belgium 1.69 1.13 1 1 1 3 5 122
France 2.07 1.34 1 1 1 3 5 136
Germany 2.12 1.58 1 1 1 3 5 131
Hungary 1.50 0.95 1 1 1 2 4 68
Poland 2.03 1.40 1 1 1 3 5 74
UK 1.75 1.12 1 1 1 3 5 194
B. by 3-digit sector
Cement 2.33 1.52 1 1 1 4 5 63
Ceramics 2.15 1.46 1 1 1 3 5 13
Chemical & Plastic 1.86 1.26 1 1 1 3 5 118
Construction 1.00 0.00 1 1 1 1 1 3
Fabricated Metals 1.67 0.93 1 1 1 3 4 45
Food & Tobacco 1.56 1.01 1 1 1 2 5 106
Fuels 2.71 1.59 1 1 3 4 5 14
Furniture & NEC 1.47 0.87 1 1 1 2 4 17
Glass 2.76 1.57 1 1 3 4 5 29
Iron & Steel 2.69 1.56 1 1 3 4 5 39
Machinery & Optics 1.26 0.68 1 1 1 1 4 68
Other Basic Metals 1.78 1.39 1 1 1 2 5 9
Other Business Services 2.67 0.58 2 2 3 3 3 3
Other Minerals 3.38 1.69 1 2 4 5 5 8
Publishing 1.58 1.02 1 1 1 2 4 19
TV Communication 1.91 1.45 1 1 1 3 5 11
Textile & Leather 1.90 1.33 1 1 1 3 5 20
Vehicles 1.62 0.99 1 1 1 2 4 47
Wholesale 1.40 0.89 1 1 1 1 3 5
Wood & Paper 1.85 1.36 1 1 1 3 5 88
Standard 
deviation
Notes: Summary statistics of the overall vulnerability score (first row), by country (panel A) and by 3-digit NACE sector (panel B). The
score ranges from 1 (no impact) to 5 (complete relocation). A score of 3 is given if at least 10% of production of employment would be
outsourced in response to future carbon pricing. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
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Table A.5: Differences in vulnerability score by sector and country
(1) (2)
Deviations from the overall mean
A. Countries
Belgium -0.034 0.054
France 0.361 ** 0.322 *
Germany 0.032 0.021
Hungary -0.402 * -0.378
Poland 0.311 0.013
United Kingdom -0.269 -0.032
3-digit Sector controls no yes
B. Sectors
Ceramics -0.011 -0.010
Cement 0.379 ** 0.382 ** 
Chemical & Plastic -0.168 -0.171
Fabricated Metals -0.268 * -0.272 * 
Food & Tobacco -0.474 *** -0.474 ***
Fuels 0.563 0.566
Furniture & NEC -0.584 *** -0.583 ***
Glass 0.752 *** 0.752 ***
Iron & Steel 0.703 *** 0.697 ***
Machinery & Optics -0.731 *** -0.733 ***
Other Basic Metals -0.284 ** -0.287
Other Minerals 1.278 ** 1.285 ** 
Publishing -0.415 * -0.413 * 
Textile & Leather -0.130 -0.125
TV & Communication -0.028 -0.025
Vehicles -0.434 *** -0.447 ***
Wood & Paper -0.149 -0.147
Employment control no yes
Observations 725 725
Notes: Reported coefficients represent the deviation of a country/sector’s intercept from the overall mean vulnerability score. Panel A is
based on a regression of the vulnerability score on country dummies with additional controls for interview noise and 3-digit sector (column
2). Panel B is based on a regression of the vulnerability score on broadly defined sector dummies with additional controls for interview
noise and employment (column 2). The asterisks indicate statistical significance of a t-test of equality of the country/sector’s intercept and
the overall mean (* p<0.1, ** p<0.5, *** p<0.01). NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
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Table A.6: Descriptive statistics (employment, energy prices)
Mean Min P25 Median P75 Max Firms
A. Europe
employment 132 668 1 22 42 99 187,586 407,905
energy price 760 428 122 451 604 941 2,726 407,905
log(employment) 3.94 1.14 0.00 3.09 3.74 4.60 12.14 407,905
log(energy price) 6.50 0.50 4.81 6.11 6.40 6.85 7.91 407,905
Δlog(employment) 0.00 0.23 -1.99 -0.05 0.00 0.07 1.99 407,905
Δlog(energy price) 0.08 0.14 -1.12 0.02 0.09 0.15 1.29 407,905
B. OECD
employment 134 678 1 23 44 103 187,586 516,128
energy price 789 404 122 480 683 1,014 2,726 516,128
log(employment) 3.98 1.13 0.00 3.14 3.78 4.64 12.14 516,128
log(energy price) 6.55 0.48 4.81 6.17 6.53 6.92 7.91 516,128
Δlog(employment) 0.00 0.22 -1.99 -0.04 0.00 0.06 1.99 516,128
Δlog(energy price) 0.06 0.14 -1.33 0.00 0.07 0.13 1.29 516,128
Standard 
deviation
where p fct is the price of fuel f ∈{electricity, gas, liquid fuel, solid fuel} in country c and year t, and
where ω fs is the expenditure share of fuel f in sector c. Since expenditure shares are not available for
all countries in the sample, we impute them using UK data at the 3-digit NACE code taken from the
Quarterly Fuels Inquiry maintained by the UK Office for National Statistics. Moreover, we hold these
shares fixed at their 2004 values in order to avoid the issue of endogenously changing fuel expenditures.
Vulnerable sectors We define a dummy variable HIs at the sector level which equals 1 if, in our
interview sample, the employment-weighted average VS is above the median VS calculated across all
sectors.
A.2.2 Estimation
We estimate the equation
4lisct = β0+β1HIs+β24pesct +β34pesct ·HIs+λct +HIs ·λct +∆εit (A.2)
where l = log(employment) and pesct = log(P
e
sct), εit is the unobserved error term and λct denotes a full
set of country-by-year effects.
If energy prices are predetermined, i.e. E [peτεit ] 6= 0 for τ > t, for example if unobserved shocks
to employment are a function of predicted future energy price, then the lagged level of the energy
price pesct−1 is a valid instrument for4pesct . With endogenous energy prices E [peτεit ] 6= 0 for τ ≥ t the
twice lagged level of the energy price is available as an instrument. We construct instruments for the
interaction term4pesct ·HIs in an analogous fashion.
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A.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.7: Sector classification
Sector NACE Sectors CITL 2008 sectors
Food & Tobacco 15, 16
Textile & Leather 17, 18, 19
Wood & Paper 20,21 9
Publishing 22
Fuels 23 2,3
Chemical & Plastic 24, 25
Glass 261 7
Ceramics 262 8
Cement 264, 265,266 6
Other Minerals 267, 268
Iron & Steel 271, 272, 273, 275 5
Other Basic Metals 274
Fabricated Metals 28
Machinery & Optics 29, 30, 31,33
TV & Communication 32
Vehicles 34,35
Furniture & NEC 36
Notes: NACE sectors codes are based on NACE 1.1. NEC: Not elsewhere classified.
Figure A.2: The shape of the exit probability function
viii
Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk
Figure A.3: Relative size of exemption groups in different samples
(a) All matched EU ETS firms
(b) Matched EU ETS firms in 6 interview countries (c) Interviewed EU ETS firms only
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
not exempt A B C
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
not exempt A B C
Share of firms Share of employment
Share of emissions (CITL&ORBIS) Share of emissions (IA)
Notes: The charts display the relative size of each category of sectors in the EU ETS defined by the exemption criteria. The first bar indicates
the category’s share of firms, the second bar its share in employment, and the third and fourth bars its share in CO2 emissions, based on
figures from the CITL-ORBIS match and from the EU Impact Assessment (IA), respectively. The sample underlying figure (a) includes all
manufacturing firms in the EU ETS which we could match to ORBIS. Figure (b) is based on all such firms located in the six countries under
study. Figure (c) is based only on EU ETS firms that we interviewed. Hence, we cannot report CO2 emissions based on EU IA data as these
are only available at the sector level and not for individual firms.
Figure A.4: Distribution of the vulnerability score
(a) Shares in number of firms (b) Shares in employment (c) Shares in CO2 emissions
Notes: The graphs show the distribution of the vulnerability score for interviewed firms included in the EU ETS and part of each group of
sectors defined in Sections 3.4 and 4. Panel a reports the shares of firms, panel b employment shares, and panel c CO2 emission shares,
based on average permits surrendered in 2007 and 2008.
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Table A.8: Regressions of the vulnerability score on CI and region specific TI (long version)
(1) (2) (3)
Vulnerability Score
Sectoral Carbon Intensity (CI) 0.234*** 0.547*** 0.551***
(0.060) (0.169) (0.166)
Sectoral Trade Intensity (TI) 0.376** 0.695*** 1.454***
      with LESS developed countries (0.164) (0.232) (0.245)
TI with LEAST developed countries -0.228*** -0.422*** -0.740***
(0.076) (0.157) (0.174)
TI with Developed non-EU countries 0.117 -0.216 -0.593***
(0.125) (0.243) (0.219)
TI with EU countries -0.229** -0.411*** -0.680***
(0.114) (0.143) (0.190)
CI X CI -0.069** -0.092**
(0.030) (0.045)
TI less X TI less -0.154 -0.718***
(0.121) (0.131)
TI least X TI least 0.047* 0.094***
(0.027) (0.029)
TI developed X TI developed 0.074 0.212***
(0.088) (0.074)
TI EU X TI EU 0.014 0.305***
(0.091) (0.110)
TI less X CI 0.378 0.233
(0.290) (0.425)
TI least X CI 0.708*** 0.762***
(0.212) (0.187)
TI developed X CI -0.779*** -0.685***
(0.232) (0.179)
TI EU X CI 0.167 0.062
(0.173) (0.223)
Weights no no employment
Observations 389 389 389
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2. WLS regression in column 3. The dataset is a cross section of 389 interviewed firms that are
part of the EU ETS and for which CITL data, carbon intensity data and geographically precise sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are
available. Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*),
5%(**) and 1%(***) level. Includes a constant, country dummies and interview noise controls (not reported). The dependent variable is the
vulnerability score of the firm given by the interviews data. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity and TI trade intensity
which are calculated from Eurostat and the EU Commission data. X indicates that the two variables are interacted or squared.
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Table A.9: Regressions of the vulnerability score on CI, EI and II
(1) (2) (3)
Vulnerability Score
Carbon Intensity (CI) 0.217*** 0.611*** 0.312
(0.058) (0.201) (0.202)
Sectoral Export intensity (EI) -0.072
(0.160)
Sectoral Import intensity (II) 0.142
(0.153)
EI with LESS developed countries 0.200 1.613***
(0.263) (0.286)
II with LESS developed countries 0.350 0.640**
(0.225) (0.273)
EI with LEAST developed countries -0.476** -0.833***
(0.203) (0.240)
II with LEAST developed countries 0.030 -0.052
(0.185) (0.284)
EI with Developed non-EU countries -0.083 -0.551**
(0.242) (0.216)
II with Developed non-EU countries -0.156 -0.443
(0.416) (0.374)
EI with EU countries 0.544 0.016
(0.544) (0.675)
II with EU countries -0.827 -0.901
(0.579) (0.682)
EI less X EI less 0.081 -0.467***
(0.164) (0.171)
II less X II less -0.018 -0.363**
(0.102) (0.139)
EI least X EI least 0.089*** 0.095
(0.034) (0.097)
II least X II least -0.012 0.007
(0.020) (0.034)
EI developed X EI developed 0.328** 0.303**
(0.137) (0.134)
II developed X II developed -0.044 0.010
(0.098) (0.110)
EI EU X EI EU -0.926** -0.243
(0.361) (0.386)
II EU X II EU 0.633** 0.695**
(0.305) (0.295)
EI less X CI -0.027 0.918*
(0.386) (0.512)
II less X CI 0.262 0.191
(0.214) (0.295)
EI least X CI 0.255 0.145
(0.257) (0.262)
II least X CI 0.064 0.411*
(0.169) (0.233)
EI developed X CI 0.311 0.153
(0.338) (0.394)
II developed X CI -0.354 -1.218***
(0.292) (0.410)
EI EU X CI 0.041 -3.959**
(1.419) (1.659)
II EU X CI 0.158 3.700**
(1.479) (1.692)
Weights no no employment
Observations 389 389 389
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2. WLS in column 3. The dataset is a cross-section of 389 interviewed firms that are part of the
EU ETS for which CITL, geographically precise sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. Robust standard errors, clustered
by 4-digit NACE sector, in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%(*), 5%(**) and 1%(***) level. Includes a
constant, country dummies and interview noise controls (not reported). The dependent variable is the vulnerability score of the firm given
by the interview data. In column 3, the firm’s employment is used to weight the regression. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon
intensity, EI export intensity and II import intensity which are calculated from Eurostat and the EU Commission data. X indicates that the
two variables are interacted or squared.
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Table A.10: List of additional sectors not to be exempted from auctioning
Sector Descripton Sector Descripton
Processing and preserving of fsh and fsh products 152 2615
Manufacture of crude oils and fats 1541 262
Manufacture of starches and starch products 1562 Manufacture of ceramic tles and fags 263
Manufacture of sugar 1583 Producton of abrasive products 2681
Manufacture of distlled potable alcoholic beverages 1591 Manufacture of tubes 272
Producton of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials 1592 Precious metals producton 2741
Manufacture of wines 1593 Lead, zinc and tn producton 2743
Manufacture of other non-distlled fermented beverages 1595 Manufacture of cutlery 2861
Preparaton and spinning of woollen-type fbres 1712 Manufacture of tools 2862
Preparaton and spinning of worsted-type fbres 1713 2874
Preparaton and spinning of fax-type fbres 1714 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 2875
1715 291
Manufacture of sewing threads 1716 Manufacture of furnaces and furnace burners 2921
Preparaton and spinning of other textle fbres 1717 Manufacture of non-domestc cooling and ventlaton equipment 2923
Textle weaving 172 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery n.e.c. 2924
Manufacture of made-up textle artcles, except apparel 174 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 293
Manufacture of other textles 175 Manufacture of machine- tools 294
Manufacture of knited and crocheted fabrics 176 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 295
Manufacture of knited and crocheted artcles 177 Manufacture of weapons and ammuniton 296
Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories 182 Manufacture of electric domestc appliances 2971
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of artcles of fur 183 Manufacture of ofce machinery and computers 300
Tanning and dressing of leather 191 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 311
192 Manufacture of electricity distributon and control apparatus 312
Manufacture of footwear 193 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 313
201 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary bateries 314
Manufacture of artcles of cork, straw and plaitng materials 2052 Manufacture of lightng equipment and electric lamps 315
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 211 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 3162
Manufacture of wallpaper 2124 321
Other publishing 2215 322
Manufacture of refned petroleum products 232 323
Processing of nuclear fuel 233 331
Manufacture of dyes and pigments 2412 332
242 Manufacture of optcal instruments and photographic equipment 334
244 Manufacture of watches and clocks 335
Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparatons 2452 Building and repairing of ships and boats 351
Manufacture of essental oils 2463 Manufacture of aircraf and spacecraf 353
Manufacture of photographic chemical material 2464 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 354
Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media 2465 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 355
Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 2466 Manufacture of jewellery and related artcles 362
Manufacture of man-made fbres 247 Manufacture of musical instruments 363
Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes 2511 Manufacture of sports goods 364
Manufacture of fat glass 2611 Manufacture of games and toys 365
Manufacture of hollow glass 2613 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 366
NACE 
sector code 
(Rev 1.1) 
NACE 
sector code 
(Rev 1.1) 
Manufacture and processing of other glass including technical 
glassware
Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for 
constructon purposes; manufacture of refractory ceramic 
Manufacture of fasteners, screw machine products, chain and 
springs
Throwing and preparaton of silk, including from noils, and 
throwing and texturing of synthetc or artfcial flament yarns
Manufacture of machinery for the producton and use of 
mechanical power, except aircraf, vehicle and cycle engines
Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and 
harness
Sawmilling and planing of wood, impregnaton of wood
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components
Manufacture of television and radio transmiters and  apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic 
appliances
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 
checking, testng, navigatng and other purposes, except 
industrial process control equipment
Manufacture of pestcides and other agro-chemical products
Manufacture of pharmaceutcals, medicinal chemicals and 
botanical products
Notes: The table lists sectors that will be exempted from auctioning under the current EC criteria, but would no longer be exempted under
our proposed rule change. The list contains about half of the sectors currently exempted under EU Commission proposals. The EC criteria
apply at the 4 digit (NACE Rev. 1.1) sectoral level. For conciseness, we report the 3-digit sector if all 4-digit sub sectors in a 3-digit sector
would cease to be exempted.
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Figure A.5: Distribution of subsidies per job - full sample
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Notes: The figure compares the implicit distribution of subsidies per job – calculated in C per employee for a permit price of C30 – under
free permit allocation with the distribution resulting from the exemption rules proposed by the EC. Based on the CITL/ORBIS matched
sample of 3,039 firms.
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